State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
Neb.2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first‑degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged conduct occurring from the late 1990s through 2006.
- Gill moved to quash the information (statute‑of‑limitations ground) and later moved for absolute discharge claiming statutory and constitutional speedy trial violations.
- The district court ruled some counts timely, quashed parts of others, and set trial dates; Gill moved to continue trial on June 20, 2016, to finish depositions, and the court granted the continuance to Sept. 14, 2016 (Gill did not object to the new date).
- Subsequent State and defense continuances and an amendment to the information moved trial dates further; Gill filed a renewed motion to quash and a motion for absolute discharge on Nov. 4, 2016.
- The district court denied absolute discharge, finding Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial past the 6‑month period, and alternatively found State‑attributable delay insufficient to require discharge.
- Gill appealed; the Supreme Court considered (1) appellate jurisdiction over the statute‑of‑limitations quarrel, (2) whether defendant’s continuance triggered a permanent statutory waiver, and (3) the constitutional speedy trial claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court may review Gill’s statute‑of‑limitations (motion to quash) claim | State: the quash ruling was not part of the final order denying absolute discharge and statute‑of‑limitations rulings are not final, appealable orders | Gill: order denying absolute discharge failed to address or dispose of the motion to quash; he preserved the issue | Court: no jurisdiction to review the statute‑of‑limitations claim because such rulings are not final and the appealed order did not decide it |
| Whether Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy trial right by requesting a continuance that extended trial beyond six months under § 29‑1207(4)(b) | State: Gill’s June 20, 2016 continuance moved trial beyond the statutory period and triggered the statutory permanent waiver provision | Gill: his continuance was for a definite, not indefinite, period; allowing waiver for any continuance would be absurd and overbroad | Court: waiver provision applies whether continuance was definite or indefinite; Gill permanently waived statutory speedy‑trial right because his continuance extended trial beyond the 6‑month clock |
| Whether the reason for the continuance affects applicability of the § 29‑1207(4)(b) waiver | State: reason irrelevant under precedent interpreting the statute broadly | Gill: reason and character of continuance matter; not every defense filing should cause permanent waiver | Court: reason is irrelevant; statute’s language and precedent provide permanent waiver whenever defendant‑requested continuance extends trial beyond six months |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy trial right was violated despite statutory waiver | Gill: even if statutory waiver, constitutional claim remains and merits discharge | State: constitutional protection remains but defendant failed to show prejudice or meet balancing factors | Court: no merit to constitutional speedy‑trial claim; dismissal not required |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (interpretation of § 29‑1207 waiver language)
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (holding defendant’s continuance can effect a permanent statutory waiver)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (applying waiver where a motion to continue/discharge extended trial beyond the statutory period)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (discussing abuses of the strict 6‑month clock and prompting statutory amendment)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (statute‑of‑limitations motions are not final, appealable orders)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (absolute discharge motion as final, appealable in speedy‑trial context)
- State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476, 763 N.W.2d 380 (background on exclusion of defendant‑caused continuance time)
- State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747, 884 N.W.2d 696 (standard of review for speedy‑trial dismissal)
Disposition
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Gill’s motion for absolute discharge.