State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest arising from alleged acts in the 1990s–2006 timeframe.
- Gill moved to quash portions of the information as time-barred; the district court partially granted quashings and allowed most counts to proceed.
- Trial was set, then Gill moved to continue on June 20, 2016 (to complete depositions); the court granted the continuance and reset trial dates several times, including responses to a State continuance and a State amendment to the information.
- The State amended the information in Oct. 2016 to add habitual-offender facts; defense sought more time to review and the court reset trial to Nov. 16, 2016.
- On Nov. 4, 2016, Gill filed a renewed motion to quash (statute of limitations) and a motion for absolute discharge claiming statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations.
- The district court denied the absolute-discharge motion, concluding Gill had permanently waived his statutory six-month speedy-trial right by requesting a continuance that moved the trial beyond six months; Gill appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant permanently waives statutory 6-month speedy-trial right by requesting a continuance that moves trial beyond six months | State: § 29-1207(4)(b) provides permanent waiver when defendant-requested continuance extends trial past six months | Gill: his continuance was definite and short; permanent waiver should not attach to any defendant filing or definite continuance | Court: Waiver attaches when defendant-requested continuance extends trial beyond the six-month period; definite vs indefinite continuance is irrelevant under § 29-1207(4)(b) |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy-trial right was violated | State: even if statutory right waived, constitutional claim fails after balancing factors | Gill: constitutional right remains and was violated despite statutory waiver | Court: No merit to constitutional claim; affirm denial of absolute discharge |
| Whether the statute-of-limitations motion (motion to quash) is reviewable in this interlocutory appeal | Gill: court erred by not resolving and preserving statute-of-limitations challenge | State: statute-of-limitations rulings are not final, appealable orders; no jurisdiction over that issue here | Court: Order appealed did not rule on motion to quash; statute-of-limitations rulings are not final for this interlocutory appeal, so court lacks jurisdiction to consider that assignment |
| Whether the reason or nature (indefinite vs definite) of continuance matters for waiver | Gill: reason and definite nature matter; should not produce broad permanent waiver | State: statute’s plain language and precedent impose waiver regardless of reason or definite/indefinite label | Court: Reason and definite/indefinite label irrelevant; waiver triggered solely by continuance moving trial past six months |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (Neb. 2014) (interpreting § 29-1207(4)(b) to create permanent waiver when defendant-requested continuance moves trial beyond six months)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 2014) (applies Mortensen where motion extended trial beyond remaining speedy-trial days)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2009) (discusses abuse of statutory speedy-trial scheme and prompted legislative amendment)
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 2014) (related precedent interpreting speedy-trial waiver language)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (Neb. 2005) (statute-of-limitations rulings do not create final, appealable orders)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 1997) (denial of absolute discharge for speedy-trial claim is a final, appealable order)