State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
Neb.2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest arising from alleged acts in the 1990s–2006; some counts had been previously quashed or narrowed on statute-of-limitations grounds.
- Gill filed pretrial motions including a motion to quash (statute of limitations) and a later motion for absolute discharge alleging statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations.
- Trial was originally set within six months but Gill moved to continue on June 20, 2016 (to finish depositions); the court granted the continuance and reset trial beyond the 6‑month period.
- The State later obtained its own continuance and amended the information to add habitual‑offender facts; subsequent continuances were agreed or acquiesced to by defense counsel.
- The district court denied Gill’s motion for absolute discharge, holding Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speed‑to‑trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that moved the trial date beyond six months, and alternatively finding state‑attributable delay insufficient to require discharge.
- Gill appealed; the Supreme Court considered whether the statutory waiver applied, whether the constitutional speedy‑trial claim succeeded, and whether the court could reach the statute‑of‑limitations (motion to quash) issue on interlocutory appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Gill) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond six months | The continuance Gill requested extended the trial date past six months and thus, under § 29‑1207(4)(b), Gill permanently waived the statutory speedy‑trial right | Gill argued his continuance was for a definite period and that any filing should not amount to permanent waiver; he contended the waiver rule should be limited | Held: Waiver is permanent whenever a defendant‑requested continuance moves trial beyond the calculated 6‑month date; definite vs. indefinite continuances irrelevant; Gill waived the statutory right |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy‑trial right was violated | The State argued Gill’s statutory waiver did not eliminate constitutional protection and that no constitutional violation occurred here | Gill argued his constitutional speedy‑trial right was violated regardless of statutory waiver | Held: Constitutional claim rejected — waiver of statutory remedy does not automatically produce a constitutional violation and Gill failed to show constitutional-speedy‑trial entitlement under applicable balancing test |
| Whether the court could address Gill’s motion to quash (statute of limitations) on this interlocutory appeal | The State argued statute‑of‑limitations rulings are not final, appealable orders and do not affect the substantial‑rights finality required here | Gill argued failure to rule on or consider his motion to quash was error and that the issue should be reviewable | Held: Motion to quash is not a final, appealable order; the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the statute‑of‑limitations assignment on this interlocutory appeal |
| Whether trial court miscalculated excludable days or attributed delay incorrectly | The State maintained the calculation supported waiver and that any remaining state delay was insufficient for discharge | Gill contended the court erred in calculating dates and attributing delays to him | Held: Court’s factual calculation that Gill’s June 20, 2016 continuance moved trial 49 days beyond the then‑calculated 6‑month cutoff was not clearly erroneous; waiver stands |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (explaining permanent waiver under amended § 29‑1207(4)(b))
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (discussing abuses of speedy‑trial clock and prompting statutory amendment)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (applying waiver language where continuance moved trial beyond 6 months)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (holding statute‑of‑limitations rulings do not create final, appealable orders)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (holding that speedy‑trial discharge affects a substantial right and is appealable)