State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged conduct largely from the late 1990s and early 2000s.
- Gill filed motions to quash (statute of limitations) and later moved for absolute discharge claiming violations of statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights; the court quashed one incest count and partially quashed another before arraignment/rearraignment.
- Trial was initially set within the six-month statutory window; on June 20, 2016, Gill moved to continue trial because depositions were incomplete; the court granted the continuance and reset trial outside the six-month period (to Sept. 14, 2016) and Gill did not object to the new date.
- Subsequent continuances and an amendment to the information (to add habitual-offender facts and conform dates) produced additional delay; defense requested extra time to review the amended information and did not object to a November trial date.
- Gill later renewed his statute-of-limitations motion and moved for absolute discharge; the district court denied absolute discharge, finding Gill permanently waived his statutory speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond six months.
- Gill appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the separate statute-of-limitations motion because rulings on limitations are not final orders and (2) Gill permanently waived his statutory speedy-trial right; his constitutional speedy-trial claim also failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gill permanently waived his statutory 6-month speedy-trial right under § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond six months | State: Gill requested the continuance; under § 29-1207(4)(b) such a request that moves trial past 6 months effects a permanent waiver | Gill: His continuance was for a definite time and not indefinite; routinely filing or requesting continuances should not automatically cause permanent waiver | Held: Court affirmed waiver — the statute’s waiver applies whether continuance is definite or indefinite if the continuance, when requested by defendant, moves trial beyond the computed 6-month period |
| Whether the trial court erred by not ruling on Gill’s separate motion to quash (statute-of-limitations) and whether that issue is appealable here | Gill: Trial court should have resolved the motion to quash; he preserved the issue for appeal | State: A ruling on statute of limitations is not a final, appealable order and the record shows no ruling was insisted upon | Held: Court lacked jurisdiction to review the limitations claim because such rulings do not affect a substantial right and are not final orders |
| Whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated despite statutory waiver | Gill: Even if statutory right waived, constitutional speedy-trial claim remains and should succeed | State: Constitutional claim fails on the record; statutory waiver does not remove constitutional protections but facts do not support relief | Held: Court found no merit to Gill’s constitutional speedy-trial claim |
| Whether the nature or reason for the continuance matters to the waiver analysis | Gill: Reason and definite vs. indefinite character of continuance matter; otherwise any defendant action could operate as permanent waiver | State: Statute’s language is broad; reason and definite/indefinite status are irrelevant if continuance extends trial beyond six months | Held: Court held reason and definite/indefinite character are irrelevant; only whether the requested continuance moved trial past the six-month clock matters |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (permanent statutory-waiver interpretation of § 29-1207(4)(b))
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (application of waiver when motion moves trial beyond the 6-month clock)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (background on speedy-trial clock abuse and impetus for statutory amendment)
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (prior interpretation relied on by district court)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute-of-limitations motions not final orders)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (absolute discharge rulings as appealable when raising speedy-trial claims)
- State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standard of review on speedy-trial dismissal)