State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852

Background

Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged conduct from the late 1990s–2006; some counts were later quashed or limited on statute-of-limitations grounds.
Gill filed a motion to quash (statute of limitations) and later moved for continuances; trial was originally set within the 6‑month statutory period but was continued several times with Gill’s participation.
On June 20, 2016, Gill orally moved to continue because he had not finished depositions; the court rescheduled trial beyond the 6‑month statutory period and Gill did not object to the new date.
The State later obtained a continuance over Gill’s nonconsent and amended the information to add habitual‑criminal allegations; defense counsel sought additional time to review the amendment and did not object to another new trial date.
Gill filed a renewed motion to quash (statute of limitations) and a motion for absolute discharge asserting statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial violations; the district court denied absolute discharge, finding Gill permanently waived his statutory speedy‑trial right by seeking a continuance that moved trial past 6 months, and alternatively that State delay did not exceed 168 days.
Gill appealed the denial of absolute discharge; the Court addressed appellate jurisdiction over the statute‑of‑limitations claim and then considered statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial claims.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Gill's Argument	Held
Whether Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond 6 months	§ 29‑1207(4)(b) deems waived any speedy‑trial right when a defendant’s continuance extends the trial date past 6 months; waiver applies regardless of whether continuance was definite or indefinite	Gill: his continuance was definite and routine (not an indefinite abdication); construing the statute to create a permanent waiver from any continuance is absurd and overbroad	Court: Affirmed waiver—defendant waived statutory right because his June 20 continuance moved trial beyond the computed 6‑month date; definite vs. indefinite is irrelevant under § 29‑1207(4)(b)
Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy‑trial rights were violated	Even if statutory right waived, constitutional claim requires four‑factor balancing and proof of prejudice; State argued no constitutional violation	Gill argued constitutional right independently violated by overall delay	Court: No merit to constitutional claim; affirmed denial of absolute discharge on constitutional ground
Whether the court may review Gill’s motion to quash (statute of limitations) on this interlocutory appeal	The ruling denying absolute discharge is final and appealable; but a ruling on a motion to quash for statute of limitations is not a final, appealable order and does not affect a substantial right	Gill sought review of the statute‑of‑limitations ruling joined to the appeal from denial of absolute discharge	Court: Lacked jurisdiction to consider the statute‑of‑limitations assignment because that issue either was not ruled on below or, even if ruled, is not a final appealable order

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (discussing permanent waiver under amended § 29‑1207(4)(b))
State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (applying waiver rule where a motion extended trial beyond the 6‑month clock)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (describing abuse of speedy‑trial computation and prompting statutory amendment)
State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (speedy‑trial waiver interpretation relied on by trial court)
State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute‑of‑limitations motion not a substantial‑right order)
State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (distinguishing speedy‑trial/double jeopardy finality from statute‑of‑limitations rulings)
State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standard of review for speedy‑trial dismissal)