State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest relating to alleged offenses from the late 1990s and 2000s.
- Gill moved to quash portions of the information as time-barred; the district court partially granted and denied aspects of that motion in Feb. 2016.
- Trial was set and reset multiple times; Gill moved to continue on June 20, 2016 for depositions and agreed to a new trial date (Sept. 14), and defense counsel did not object when the court later reset dates after the State’s and court’s motions.
- The State later amended the information in Oct. 2016 to add habitual-offender facts; defense sought additional time and the court set trial for Nov. 16, 2016.
- Gill filed a motion for absolute discharge (statutory and constitutional speedy-trial claims) on Nov. 4, 2016; the district court denied absolute discharge on Nov. 14, 2016, concluding Gill permanently waived his statutory speedy-trial right by requesting a continuance that moved the trial beyond the 6-month period.
- Gill appealed; the Supreme Court considered (1) whether it had jurisdiction to review statute-of-limitations/quash issues joined to the appeal and (2) whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6-month speedy-trial right and whether his constitutional right was violated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court may review Gill’s motion to quash (statute of limitations) on this interlocutory appeal | State: motion to quash is not part of the final order and thus not reviewable here | Gill: joinder of quash preserved the issue for appeal | Court: No jurisdiction to consider quash; statute-of-limitations ruling is not a final appealable matter and the record lacks a ruling on it |
| Whether Gill permanently waived statutory 6-month speedy-trial right under § 29-1207(4)(b) by moving to continue trial | State: Gill’s continuance moved trial beyond 6 months and thus constituted permanent waiver | Gill: his continuance was definite; not an indefinite continuance; not every defendant filing should cause permanent waiver | Court: Held waiver applies; definite vs indefinite is irrelevant — Gill waived statutory right when his continuance extended trial past 6 months |
| Whether the reason for continuance affects waiver under § 29-1207(4)(b) | State: reason irrelevant to waiver analysis | Gill: reason and nature of continuance matter; otherwise any filing could waive right | Court: Reason for continuance is irrelevant; statutory text creates permanent waiver when motion causes trial date to exceed 6 months |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy-trial right was violated | Gill: even if statutory waiver, constitutional right still violated | State: constitutional right must be analyzed under balancing test and claim lacks merit | Court: No merit to constitutional claim; statutory waiver does not eliminate constitutional protection but Gill’s claim failed on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (interpretation of § 29-1207(4)(b) discussed)
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (holds continuance that moves trial beyond 6 months effects permanent statutory waiver)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (background on abuse of speedy-trial clock and impetus for statutory amendment)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (applies Mortensen waiver rule to motions that extend trial beyond 6 months)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (statute-of-limitations motion is not a final, appealable order)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (discusses finality of discharge rulings affecting substantial rights)
- State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747, 884 N.W.2d 696 (standard of review for speedy-trial dismissal)
- State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476, 763 N.W.2d 380 (pre-amendment approach to excludable delays)