State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852

Background

Joseph A. Gill was charged in 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged acts between the late 1990s and mid-2000s.
Gill moved to quash portions of the information as time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations; the district court granted partial relief and sustained other counts as timely based on legislative amendments to limitations for child sexual assault and incest.
Trial was set and subsequently continued several times: Gill requested a continuance on June 20, 2016 for depositions (rescheduling trial to Sept. 14), the State obtained a continuance for victim’s pregnancy (rescheduling to Oct. 12), and an amended information and additional continuance later moved trial dates to Nov. 16.
Gill filed a motion for absolute discharge alleging statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations; the district court denied discharge, finding Gill’s June 20 continuance moved the trial beyond the statutory 6‑month period and thus constituted a permanent statutory waiver under § 29-1207(4)(b).
The court also concluded, alternatively, that even without waiver the delay attributable to the State did not exceed the statutory period; Gill appealed the denial of absolute discharge but the court found no final, appealable ruling on his separate statute-of-limitations quash motion.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Gill's Argument	Held
Whether Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right by requesting a continuance that pushed trial past six months	The June 20 continuance extended trial beyond the 6‑month clock and § 29‑1207(4)(b) deems such continuances a permanent waiver	The continuance was for a definite period; waiver should apply only to indefinite continuances and not to any defendant filing	Held: Waiver applies; the statute’s plain language makes the definite/indefinite nature irrelevant—Gill permanently waived the statutory right when his continuance moved trial beyond six months
Whether Gill was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial	Even if statutory waiver applies, constitutional protection remains; State argued no constitutional violation occurred on the facts	Gill argued constitutional speedy‑trial rights were violated irrespective of statutory waiver	Held: No merit to the constitutional claim; court affirmed denial of absolute discharge on constitutional grounds
Whether the court erred by failing to rule on Gill’s motion to quash (statute of limitations) and whether that issue is appealable	The State argued a ruling on statute of limitations is not a final appealable order and the district court did not rule on the motion	Gill argued the court should have resolved the quash motion and that omission was error	Held: Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the statute‑of‑limitations claim; rulings on limitations are not final, appealable orders and the record shows no ruling was insisted upon below

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (interpreting § 29-1207(4)(b) to create a permanent waiver when a defendant’s continuance moves trial beyond six months)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (discussing dangers of defense-caused delays and prompting statutory amendment)
State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (applying Mortensen to find waiver where a motion to continue/discharge extended trial past the remaining speedy‑trial time)
State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (holding statute‑of‑limitations rulings do not constitute final, appealable orders)