State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852

Background

Joseph A. Gill was charged in November 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged conduct from the 1990s–2006; some counts were the subject of statute-of-limitations challenges and the court quashed or limited certain allegations.
Gill filed a motion to quash (statute of limitations) in November 2015 and later moved for continuances; trial was set and repeatedly continued (defense continuance June 20, 2016; State continuance July 2016; amendment to information and further continuance October–November 2016).
On November 4, 2016, Gill moved again to quash and separately moved for absolute discharge alleging statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations; the district court’s November 14/15, 2016 order denied absolute discharge but did not rule on the separate motion to quash.
The district court concluded that Gill had permanently waived his statutory 6-month speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory period; alternatively, the court found state-attributable delay insufficient for discharge.
Gill appealed, challenging (1) denial of absolute discharge under the statute, (2) denial of constitutional speedy-trial claim, and (3) the court’s failure to rule on his statute-of-limitations motion-to-quash.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred in denying absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (statutory speedy-trial)	State: Gill requested a continuance that moved trial past 6 months, so he waived the statutory right	Gill: His continuance was for a definite period and did not amount to a permanent waiver; not every defense filing should trigger waiver	Court: Affirmed — a continuance (definite or indefinite) that extends trial past the 6-month clock effects a permanent waiver under § 29-1207(4)(b) when calculated at time of the continuance
Whether Gill preserved and may appeal the statute-of-limitations (motion to quash) ruling	Gill: The quash issue was properly before the court and should be considered on appeal	State: A ruling on statute-of-limitations is not a final, appealable order and the trial court did not rule on the motion; appellant failed to secure a ruling below	Court: No jurisdiction to address the statute-of-limitations claim on this interlocutory appeal; motion to quash is not a final order
Whether the district court abused discretion in computing attributable delay (state vs. defendant)	Gill: Some delays should be attributed to the State	State: Delays identified were defendant-attributable or insufficient when attributed to State	Court: Agreed with trial court’s factual calculation that defendant’s continuance extended trial beyond 6 months; alternative state-delay calculation not reversible
Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated	Gill: Even if statutory waiver occurred, constitutional speedy-trial claim requires balancing and relief	State: Constitutional right not violated based on facts and balancing test	Court: No merit to constitutional claim; permanent statutory waiver does not eliminate constitutional protection, but Gill failed to show constitutional violation

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (interpretation of § 29-1207 waiver language)
State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (§ 29-1207(4)(b) creates permanent waiver when defendant continuance extends trial beyond 6 months)
State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (motion-to-discharge treated as continuance that can effect waiver)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (discussion prompting statutory amendment and concurrence criticizing defense delay tactics)
State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute-of-limitations ruling not final for purposes of interlocutory appeal)
State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (absolute discharge rulings affect a substantial right and are appealable)
State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standards for reviewing speedy-trial dismissals)