State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
Neb.2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged historical offenses (1996–2006).
- Gill moved to quash portions of the information as time barred; the district court partially granted and partially denied that motion (ruling some counts timely).
- Trial was set and then continued multiple times: Gill moved to continue on June 20, 2016 (to complete depositions) which moved trial beyond the 6‑month statutory window; later State and defense-requested continuances and an amended information led to further rescheduling.
- Gill filed a motion for absolute discharge (statutory and constitutional speedy trial claims) and a renewed motion to quash; the court ruled on the discharge motion denying relief but did not rule on the separate motion to quash.
- The district court concluded Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended trial past six months; the court alternatively found State-attributable delay was insufficient to require discharge.
- Gill appealed the denial of absolute discharge; the Supreme Court limited its review to issues affecting the final order (absolute discharge) and declined to consider the statute-of-limitations quash issue as not presented by the final order.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Gill's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond six months | The continuance Gill requested (June 20, 2016) extended the trial date beyond the 6‑month clock, so under § 29‑1207(4)(b) Gill permanently waived the statutory right | The continuance was for a definite period and thus should not effect a permanent waiver; not every defendant filing or acting should trigger permanent waiver | Held for State — waiver doctrinally applies whether continuance is definite or indefinite; Gill’s June 20 continuance moved trial past the statutory six months and effected a permanent statutory waiver |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy‑trial right was violated | N/A (State argued no constitutional violation) | Even if statutory waiver, constitutional protection remains and should be evaluated for prejudice and other balancing factors | Held for State — court found no merit to constitutional claim (no reversible constitutional-speedy‑trial violation shown) |
| Whether the trial court’s order denying absolute discharge permitted appellate review of Gill’s separate motion to quash (statute of limitations) | The appeal is limited to the final order denying absolute discharge; the quash ruling is not before the court | Gill argued the court erred by not ruling on or addressing the motion to quash and that statute‑of‑limitations error should be reviewable | Held for State — appellate jurisdiction limited to final order; statute‑of‑limitations motion-to-quash is not a final appealable order and the record shows no ruling to appeal |
| Whether the reason for, or nature (definite v. indefinite) of, a continuance matters to the § 29‑1207(4)(b) waiver analysis | Waiver applies broadly regardless of reason or whether continuance was definite or indefinite | Gill contended the statute should be read to limit permanent waiver to indefinite continuances and that broad reading produces absurd results | Held for State — court rejects limitation; statute’s waiver language is plain and applies irrespective of reason or definite/indefinite character |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (interpreting § 29‑1207(4)(b) as creating a permanent waiver when defendant-requested continuance moves trial beyond six months)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (applying Mortensen to motion‑to‑discharge/continuance context)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (discussing abuses of the speedy‑trial clock and prompting legislative amendment)
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (discussed in district court and cited on waiver interpretation)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (motion to quash on statute‑of‑limitations not a final appealable order)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (distinguishing statute‑of‑limitations rulings from substantial‑right final orders)
- State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standard of review for speedy‑trial dismissal rulings)
Outcome: The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Gill’s motion for absolute discharge.