State v. Gill
235 Ariz. 418
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Defendant Elizabeth Gill, on felony probation, was found possessing letters and checks taken from multiple residents’ mailboxes on her delivery route.
- Gill was charged with aggravated identity theft, five counts of third-degree burglary (A.R.S. § 13-1506(A)(1)), and misdemeanor theft; she agreed to plead guilty to one burglary count under a plea deal.
- The trial court refused to accept the plea, ruling that a mailbox is not a "nonresidential structure" for third-degree burglary, and then dismissed the five burglary counts without prejudice.
- The State appealed the dismissal, asking whether a mailbox qualifies as a "nonresidential structure" under A.R.S. § 13-1501(10) and (12).
- The Court of Appeals considered statutory definitions of "nonresidential structure" and "structure," focusing on whether a mailbox is an "object," is separately securable, and is used for "lodging, business, transportation, recreation or storage."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a mailbox is a "nonresidential structure" under A.R.S. § 13-1501(10) and (12) for third-degree burglary | Mailbox qualifies as an object that is separately securable and used for storage | Mailbox is not a "place with sides and a floor" and storage is only "temporary," so it shouldn't qualify | Mailbox is an "object," separately securable, and used for "storage," therefore a "nonresidential structure" for third-degree burglary |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Garcia, 219 Ariz. 104 (App. 2008) (standard of statutory interpretation; de novo review)
- State v. Mann, 129 Ariz. 24 (App. 1981) (Salvation Army collection box held to be a nonresidential structure)
- State v. Jones, 27 Ariz. App. 180 (1976) (transitory periods during loading/unloading not "storage")
- State v. Mitchell, 138 Ariz. 478 (App. 1983) (burglary protects privacy as well as property)
- State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508 (App. 2010) (similar discussion of privacy interest in burglary)
- Corporation Comm’n v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 73 Ariz. 171 (1951) (recognition that legislature may use words of limitation to clarify statute)
