State v. Gilbert (Slip Opinion)
143 Ohio St. 3d 150
| Ohio | 2014Background
- Kareem Gilbert pleaded guilty in May 2010 under a written plea agreement: manslaughter + related counts in exchange for an agreed 18-year sentence and his cooperation/testimony against his father, Ruben Jordan.
- The plea required Gilbert to provide truthful, complete testimony and expressly waived double-jeopardy and speedy-trial objections if the agreement were later terminated.
- The trial court accepted the plea and entered a Crim.R. 32(C)-compliant final judgment and sentence the same day.
- One year later the state moved to vacate Gilbert’s plea, alleging he had not cooperated/testified truthfully; the trial court granted the motion, vacated the original plea and sentence, and accepted a second plea that exposed Gilbert to a new sentence (18 years to life).
- The First District reversed, holding the trial court lacked authority to revisit a valid final judgment once sentencing occurred; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Gilbert) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may vacate a guilty plea and sentence after final judgment when the defendant breaches a plea agreement | Plea agreements are contractual; breach allows reinstatement of original charges and the court may vacate the plea and resentence | Once a Crim.R. 32(C) final judgment and sentence are entered, the trial court loses jurisdiction and cannot revisit the sentence; breach does not revive jurisdiction | Court held: No. After a valid Crim.R. 32(C) final judgment and sentencing, the trial court lacks authority to vacate and resentence based on a breach of the plea agreement. |
| Whether the defendant’s post-plea waiver of double jeopardy permits reprosecution after plea is vacated | The plea contained an express waiver of double jeopardy if the agreement were terminated, so reprosecution is not barred | Double jeopardy concerns were raised but the appellate court treated related arguments as moot given the jurisdictional ruling | Court concluded the double-jeopardy argument is moot in light of the jurisdictional holding (trial court lacked authority to reopen after sentencing). |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lester, 958 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 2011) (Crim.R. 32(C) requirements establish when a judgment of conviction is final)
- State v. Carlisle, 961 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio 2011) (a judgment of conviction is final when Crim.R. 32(C) elements are met; absent statute, trial court generally cannot modify a criminal sentence after final judgment)
- State v. Bethel, 854 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 2006) (principles of contract law apply to interpretation/enforcement of plea agreements)
- Colley v. Colley, 538 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1989) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. 1991) (federal courts have inherent authority to set aside judgments procured by fraud)
- Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1944) (historic equity power to set aside fraudulently procured judgments)
- Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 215 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio 1966) (Ohio recognizes inherent power to vacate a judgment after term where judgment is voidable for fraud or collusion)