State v. Gibson, 302 Neb. 833

Defendant Jason T. Gibson pleaded no contest to attempted first‑degree sexual assault of a child (Class II felony) after the State amended an original Class IB charge; no plea agreement on sentencing.
Victim E.L. was 15; another youth, Stubblefield (18), arranged commercialized sexual encounters via Craigslist and recruited Gibson, who engaged in sexual penetration and paid Stubblefield afterward.
Gibson told police he believed the minor was 18; he has no criminal record, served 16 years in the U.S. Air Force with exemplary reviews, and psychological testing showed a low risk to reoffend.
District court sentenced Gibson to 5 years’ probation with 180 days in county jail as a condition of probation and required sex‑offender registration; the written order was valid under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑2260.
The State appealed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑2321, arguing the sentence was excessively lenient and that the court impermissibly relied on Stubblefield’s culpability; Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision.
Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review, reversed the Court of Appeals, and directed affirmation of the district court’s sentence.

Issue	State's Argument	Gibson's Argument	Held
Was the 5‑year probation (with 180 days jail as condition) excessively lenient?	Sentence depreciates seriousness of crime; imprisonment required to reflect gravity and deter.	Sentence fits offender given lack of criminal history, remorse, low recidivism risk, and statutory discretion to withhold imprisonment.	Not excessively lenient; no abuse of discretion given statutory factors and offender characteristics.
Did the district court rely on an impermissible/irrelevant factor (Stubblefield’s culpability) in sentencing?	Court improperly reduced Gibson’s punishment by focusing on Stubblefield’s greater responsibility.	Court merely commented on overall scheme and victim’s need for justice; no evidence Gibson’s sentence was reduced because of that comment.	No; remarks about Stubblefield did not show the court impermissibly considered an irrelevant factor.
Was remand to a different judge required?	(Implicit) Court of Appeals directed new judge to impose greater sentence.	Such direction was unwarranted because no abuse of discretion occurred.	No remand to a different judge; Supreme Court reversed and ordered affirmation of original sentence.

State v. Kennedy, 299 Neb. 362 (appellate review of sentences uses abuse‑of‑discretion standard)
State v. Hoffman, 246 Neb. 265 (probation leniency can be excessive where defendant poses risk and shows no remorse)
State v. Moore, 274 Neb. 790 (factors for reviewing excessively lenient sentences)
State v. Thompson, 15 Neb. App. 764 (probation with strict terms can be appropriate for sexual offenses when offender is low risk)
State v. Mora, 298 Neb. 185 (sentencing discretion and consideration of offender’s character)
State v. Ralios, 301 Neb. 1027 (relevance of offender’s life and character to sentencing)