State v. Gibson
1311003232
| Del. Super. Ct. | Dec 19, 2017Background
- In November 2013 police searched Laquan Gibson’s home and two vehicles after a confidential informant said Gibson stored drugs/weapons in his Ford Taurus; officers recovered heroin (202 bags in the Taurus; additional heroin in a Mountaineer), marijuana, a handgun, and keys. Gibson was arrested, had $340 on him, and gave a post‑Miranda statement admitting ownership of the drugs and guns, later recanting at trial and blaming a deceased friend, Jason Turner.
- Before trial, the parties stipulated to chain of custody and the admission of drug reports; drugs were tested at NMS Labs and later by the newly formed Division of Forensic Science (DFS) with Patricia Phillips as the analyst, who had contemporaneous internal disciplinary records for evidence‑handling lapses.
- Trial counsel stipulated to the drug reports; at trial the State impeached Gibson with phone‑call activity (45 calls in October) to undercut his claim of limited outside contact. The jury convicted Gibson of Tier II drug dealing, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and possession of marijuana; the Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- Gibson filed a timely Rule 61 postconviction motion alleging (1) Brady/ nondisclosure of impeachment evidence regarding Phillips’s misconduct; (2) the State’s failure to produce prison phone‑call recordings (Rule 16); (3) prosecutorial improper editorializing on cross; and (4) ineffective assistance for failing to review the October calls and failing to object to the questioning.
- The Superior Court found most prosecutorial‑misconduct claims procedurally barred for not being raised at trial or on direct appeal, but permitted review of the Phillips nondisclosure claim and the ineffective‑assistance claims. The court denied relief: no Brady violation and counsel was not ineffective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady nondisclosure of Phillips’ DFS misconduct | Phillips’ disciplinary record was favorable impeachment material; nondisclosure prejudiced Gibson because it might have altered stipulation and jury assessment | State: identity/weight of drugs were undisputed; NMS Labs confirmed results; Phillips didn’t falsify evidence and she did not testify, so disclosure would not have changed outcome | Denied — no Brady violation: stipulated reports, independent NMS confirmation, no evidence of falsification, and no prejudice shown |
| Failure to produce October 2014 prison call recordings | Calls might contain exculpatory evidence (no mention of Turner) that would rebut State’s impeachment and rehabilitate Gibson | State: only number of calls was proffered at trial; content would not change that Gibson made 45 calls; either content impeaches or does not — credibility harmed either way | Procedurally barred (not raised at trial/direct appeal) and, on merits, counsel’s strategy for not reviewing calls was reasonable; no prejudice shown |
| Prosecutorial editorializing on cross‑examination (e.g., calling answers "interesting") | Such remarks improperly convey prosecutor skepticism and impeach credibility; counsel’s failure to object was ineffective | State: comments minor and jury decides credibility; strong independent reasons to doubt Gibson (confession, lack of evidence linking Turner) | Procedurally barred in part; even assuming error, no prejudice — failure to object not ineffective because outcome would not likely differ |
| Ineffective assistance for not requesting recess to review calls | Counsel’s failure to review recordings fell below standard and prejudiced Gibson | Trial counsel made a reasoned strategic decision to avoid focusing attention on other means Gibson could have learned of Turner’s death; review would not likely have altered verdict | Denied — counsel’s choice was reasonable strategy and no reasonable probability of different result |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable exculpatory or impeachment evidence)
- Whittle v. State, 138 A.3d 1149 (Del. 2016) (postconviction claims of ineffective assistance may be raised under Rule 61 when not previously available)
- Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316 (Del. 2015) (Brady requires careful analysis where impeachment evidence could be material to trial fairness)
- Aricidiacono v. State, 125 A.3d 677 (Del. 2015) (evidence‑tampering concerns and standards for evaluating forensic lab misconduct)
- Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015) (discussing forensic lab credibility and the effect of lab misconduct on convictions)
- Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1991) (procedural bars under postconviction relief rules)
- Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506 (Del. 2001) (Brady violations can excuse procedural defaults in postconviction proceedings)
- Stevenson v. State, 469 A.2d 797 (Del. 1983) (standard for evaluating attorney competence)
- Robinson v. State, 562 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1989) (prejudice requirement for ineffective assistance claims)
- Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prosecutor should avoid remarks that may improperly influence jury)
