State v. Gibson
2017 ND 15
| N.D. | 2017Background
- Steven Gibson, incarcerated, asked his wife to sexually abuse their 14‑month‑old child; the Department of Corrections discovered the communications and Gibson was charged with related sex offenses.
- On October 2, 2015, Gibson submitted a written demand for a speedy trial to the Department for mailing to the district court and the state’s attorney.
- The Department mailed the request on October 13; the district court received it on October 15 and the state’s attorney on October 16.
- The district court scheduled Gibson’s jury trial for January 6, 2016 (96 days after Gibson gave the request to the Department; 82 days after receipt by the court/prosecutor).
- Gibson moved to dismiss on January 4, arguing the 90‑day speedy‑trial period began when he submitted the request to the Department; the district court denied the motion and Gibson entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 90‑day period in N.D.C.C. § 29‑19‑02 begin? | The State: period begins on receipt by court and prosecutor. | Gibson: period begins when he gave his speedy‑trial request to the Department for mailing. | The Court: period begins when both the district court and the prosecuting official receive the request. |
| Does a Department delay in mailing start the 90‑day clock or require dismissal under § 29‑33‑02? | State: “forthwith” forwarding duty does not change statutory start date; mailing delay does not trigger dismissal under § 29‑19‑02. | Gibson: Department’s delay means the clock should start on the date he submitted the request and dismissal is required. | The Court: § 29‑33‑02’s “forthwith” duty does not alter the start date; dismissal not required on these facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ripley, 548 N.W.2d 24 (N.D. 1996) (under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, the 90‑day period starts when court and prosecuting official receive the defendant’s request)
- State v. Moe, 581 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1998) (under North Dakota’s Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the 90‑day period begins when the state’s attorney receives the defendant’s request)
- State v. Gasal, 859 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 2015) (standards for de novo review of statutory construction in criminal speedy‑trial questions)