State v. Gerardo Jerry Ayala
03-14-00651-CR
| Tex. App. | Jan 9, 2015Background
- On Feb. 9, 2013 Ayala was arrested for DWI after a multi-car collision; officer observed signs of intoxication and Ayala refused a voluntary blood draw.
- Officer received reliable information of Ayala's two prior DWI convictions and directed jail phlebotomist to draw blood pursuant to Tex. Transp. Code §§ 724.011 and 724.012(b).
- A magistrate was available at the booking facility and obtaining a warrant would have taken ~30 minutes; officer did not seek a warrant.
- Trial court found probable cause and that the officer acted in good faith relying on the Transportation Code, but concluded there were no exigent circumstances and denied consent, holding the warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment under Missouri v. McNeely; it granted Ayala’s suppression motion.
- The State appealed, arguing (1) the statute mandates and is a reasonable search, (2) implied consent is irrevocable, (3) Texas’s exclusionary rule (Art. 38.23) does not bar evidence because officers complied with then-existing law, and (4) the federal exclusionary rule likewise does not bar admission under good‑faith exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Ayala's Argument | Held (trial court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the mandatory-draw statute authorizes warrantless blood draws under the Fourth Amendment | Statute §724.012(b) mandates draws and is constitutionally reasonable under a balancing test | Warrantless mandatory draws violate the Fourth Amendment unless a recognized exception applies | Suppression granted; warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment (no applicable exception) |
| Whether implied consent (Tex. Transp. Code §724.011) supplies legal consent for a compelled draw | Implied consent for driving is irrevocable and satisfies consent exception to warrant requirement | Implied consent was withdrawn; Fourth Amendment requires free and voluntary consent | Suppression granted; implied consent that was withdrawn is insufficient |
| Whether Texas exclusionary rule (Art. 38.23) bars evidence obtained pre‑McNeely | Officer complied with existing Texas precedent treating dissipation as exigency, so evidence was not obtained in violation of the law | Evidence was obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment and must be excluded under Art. 38.23 | Trial court treated search as unconstitutional and suppressed evidence |
| Whether federal exclusionary rule bars admission (good‑faith exceptions) | Admissible: officer reasonably relied on statute and binding precedent (Krull and Davis good‑faith doctrines) | Fourth Amendment violated; exclusionary rule requires suppression despite good‑faith claims | Trial court suppressed blood evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (held alcohol dissipation can establish exigency in DWI context)
- Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid absurd results)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create per se exigency)
- Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (Fourth Amendment balancing for certain noninvestigatory DNA collection)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (good‑faith reliance on binding precedent can defeat exclusion)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good‑faith reliance on statute later held invalid may preclude exclusion)