State v. Geoffrey King
165 A.3d 107
Vt.2016Background
- In 2008 DCF reported an alleged sexual assault by Geoffrey King; Detective Call interviewed King and witnesses through Feb. 2009 and referred the file to the Windsor County State's Attorney.
- One key witness, A.F., gave an interview in Feb. 2009 suggesting the complainant had been abused; no criminal filing followed until August 2012 (≈3½ years later).
- DCF substantiated the report in Jan. 2009; King unsuccessfully sought administrative expungement in 2012 before charges were filed in Aug. 2012.
- The 2012 charging affidavit contained no substantive evidence obtained after Feb. 2009; the new deputy state's attorney reopened the file after the complainant's mother inquired.
- At trial witnesses (the complainant and A.F.) gave inconsistent accounts across the 2009 interview, 2013 deposition, and 2014 trial testimony; the jury hung and King moved for dismissal with prejudice based on preaccusation delay.
- The superior court denied dismissal; the Vermont Supreme Court was asked to define the constitutional standard for preaccusation delay under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (King) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard governs preaccusation delay under U.S. Due Process? | The delay need not show improper motive; court should balance prejudice vs. government reasons (minority/test advocated by King). | Apply majority two‑prong test: actual substantial prejudice + improper prosecutorial purpose (e.g., tactical advantage). | Adopt majority two‑prong test: defendant must show actual substantial prejudice AND prosecutorial misconduct intended to gain tactical advantage or other impermissible purpose violating fundamental justice. |
| Does Vermont Constitution require a different, more protective standard? | Vermont's due process (Art. 4/Art. 10) should allow a more flexible/balancing test like New Hampshire/Knickerbocker or NY Singer (good cause/balance). | Vermont precedents and policy concerns counsel applying the same limited federal standard. | Apply the same two‑prong standard under Vermont Constitution; state provisions do not require broader protection here. |
| Did the ~3½ year precharge delay violate King's due process rights? | Delay impaired witness memory and introduced inconsistency that prejudiced King at trial. | Delay resulted from permissible investigative reasons (ensuring complainant would cooperate); inconsistencies aided impeachment and did not produce substantial prejudice. | King failed both prongs: no actual substantial prejudice shown, and no evidence of improper prosecutorial purpose. Dismissal denied; conviction retrial permitted. |
| Role of statutes of limitations vs. due process in stale prosecutions? | (Implicit) Due process should supplement statutes when delay causes unfairness. | Statutes of limitation are primary protection; due process has limited role and only applies in exceptional cases of prejudice + improper motive. | Confirmed: statutes of limitations are primary guard; due process relief limited and requires both substantial prejudice and impermissible prosecutorial purpose. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1971) (Due Process has limited role for preaccusation delay; dismissal warranted if delay was intentional device for tactical advantage and caused actual prejudice)
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (Investigative delay permissible; courts must consider reasons for delay and prejudice, and only delay violating fundamental conceptions of justice warrants dismissal)
- State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293 (Vt. 1994) (Vermont adopted the two‑prong federal inquiry—consider reasons for delay and actual prejudice—and found no due process violation from long investigatory delay)
- State v. Beer, 177 Vt. 245 (Vt. 2004) (applied the majority two‑prong approach; defendant failed to show actual substantial prejudice from preaccusation delay)
- State v. Knickerbocker, 152 N.H. 467 (N.H. 2005) (New Hampshire applied a balancing test: defendant must first show actual prejudice, then court balances prejudice against reasonableness of delay; discussed as contrasting approach)
