State v. Gayman, 312 Or. App. 193

Defendant (disabled) was stopped for helmet, sidewalk, and crosswalk violations while operating an electric mobility device described as a "motor assisted scooter."
Officers cited her, told her she could not ride home without a helmet and that she would be jailed if she did; she nevertheless rode home without a helmet.
Officers followed in a low-speed pursuit with lights/siren for ~2–3 minutes, arrested her at home, and charged her with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (ORS 811.540), which requires that the person be "operating a motor vehicle."
At trial the state relied on the vehicle-code definitions (ORS 801.360 and 801.590) to argue the scooter was a "motor vehicle;" defendant moved for acquittal on lack of evidence of fleeing but did not develop the motor-vehicle argument below.
The jury returned a nonunanimous guilty verdict (11–1). On appeal defendant argued the scooter was not a "motor vehicle" and the trial court plainly erred in failing to enter a judgment of acquittal sua sponte.
The Court of Appeals majority reversed: it held the vehicle code treats motor assisted scooters and motorized wheelchair operators differently from motor vehicles, concluded defendant was not operating a "motor vehicle," found plain legal error on the record, and exercised discretion to correct it; a dissent would have remanded for record development.

Issue	State's Argument	Gayman's Argument	Held
Whether defendant was "operating a motor vehicle" for ORS 811.540	Scooter qualifies as a "vehicle" and, under ORS definitions, plausibly a motor vehicle	Mobility scooter/motorized wheelchair is not a "motor vehicle" under the vehicle code and operators should be treated as pedestrians/vehicle-class exceptions	Court: motor assisted scooters/wheelchairs are not treated as "motor vehicles" in the code; defendant was not operating a motor vehicle—state failed to prove an essential element; acquittal required
Whether the trial court plainly erred by not granting a judgment of acquittal sua sponte	Error is not plain because the issue is reasonably in dispute and was not preserved	The legal error is obvious on the record and satisfies plain-error prongs; appellate correction warranted	Court: plain legal error existed (legal question, obvious, on the record) and exercised discretion to correct it and reverse
Nonunanimous verdict / instruction challenge	State concedes post-Ramos that nonunanimous instruction/11–1 verdict were plain error	Defendant argued nonunanimous instruction and verdict were erroneous	State conceded plain error; majority did not reach these issues because acquittal disposed of the case; dissent would remand for fact development instead

State v. Greene, 283 Or App 120 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (operator of a motorized wheelchair in a crosswalk is a pedestrian, not a vehicle operator for DUII purposes)
State v. Litscher, 285 Or App 508 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (standard of review for judgment-of-acquittal claims—view facts in the light most favorable to the state)
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 (Or. 1991) (factors for exercising appellate discretion to correct plain error)
State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 (Or. 1990) (formulation of the plain-error test)
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020) (nonunanimous jury verdicts for nonpetty offenses violate the Sixth Amendment)
State v. Reynolds, 250 Or App 516 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (exercise of discretion to correct plain errors when undisputed evidence shows an essential element cannot be proven)