State v. GarnerÂ, 252 N.C. App. 393

Background

Defendant was indicted for felonious larceny (12 golf-cart batteries and a pole saw taken from “Pinewood Country Club”) and felonious possession of stolen goods; tried by jury and convicted of both offenses.
Evidence included testimony from country-club employees recounting an anonymous phone call identifying the Garner brothers, surveillance footage at a recycling business, and testimony placing Defendant at the recycling location and removing stickers from batteries.
Defense objected to admission of the anonymous-call testimony under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; the trial court admitted it with limiting instructions (use only to explain investigative steps).
Trial court sentenced Defendant to 7–18 months, then arrested judgment on the possession-of-stolen-goods conviction (without stating a full rationale), and Defendant appealed.
On appeal the State conceded the larceny indictment failed to allege the owner was an entity capable of owning property (the indictment named only “Pinewood Country Club”).

Issues

Issue	State’s Argument	Garner’s Argument	Held
1. Is the larceny indictment fatally defective for failing to allege the owner is an entity capable of owning property?	Indictment insufficient but State conceded defect	Indictment is defective because “Pinewood Country Club” doesn’t import a legal entity capable of owning property	Yes. Vacated the felonious-larceny conviction (indictment failed to allege an owner capable of owning property)
2. Did admission of testimony recounting an anonymous caller violate the Confrontation Clause?	Testimony was admitted for non‑truth purpose (investigative motive); limiting instruction cured any Confrontation Clause issue; any error was harmless	Admission violated the Sixth Amendment because the anonymous caller was unavailable and not cross‑examined	No reversible error. Statements were admitted for non‑truth purpose (investigative course); even if testimonial, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given other strong evidence
3. Does the trial court’s arrest of judgment on the possession-of-stolen-goods conviction vacate that conviction and deprive appellate review?	Record indicates arrest was to avoid double jeopardy (convictions based on same property), so underlying guilty verdict remains and remand for resentencing is appropriate	Because the trial court arrested judgment without stating a reason, the conviction is vacated and not subject to appellate reinstatement	The court found indicia that judgment was arrested to avoid double jeopardy; underlying guilty verdict stands. Remanded for resentencing on possession of stolen goods

Key Cases Cited

State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 83 (recognizing indictments must allege ownership in a person or a legal entity capable of owning property)
State v. Thornton, 251 N.C. 658 (holding indictments must specify owner is a corporation or legal entity unless name imports such status)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause requires unavailability and prior opportunity for cross‑examination for testimonial statements)
State v. Pakulski, 326 N.C. 434 (distinguishing arrests of judgment that vacate convictions from those entered to address double jeopardy concerns)
State v. Pendergraft, 238 N.C. App. 516 (discussing consequences of arrested judgment and indicators for whether arrest vacates conviction)
State v. Patterson, 194 N.C. App. 608 (explaining possession-of-stolen-goods indictment need not allege owner capable of owning property)