992 N.W.2d 535
N.D.2023Background
- Corey Lynn Gardner, daytime caregiver for a two‑month‑old, was charged with child abuse under N.D.C.C. § 14‑09‑22(1) for allegedly inflicting or allowing bodily injury to the infant.
- The district court’s jury instructions listed the elements as including that the defendant “willfully inflicted or willfully allowed to be inflicted upon the child bodily injury.”
- Gardner did not object to the jury instructions at trial and was convicted by a jury; she appealed, raising (1) instructional error (placement of “willfully” before “allowed”), (2) a unanimity claim concerning alternative means, and (3) insufficiency of the evidence.
- The State defended the instructions as correctly stating the statutory culpability and argued the alternative means are nonseparate ways to commit the same offense.
- The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the instructional claim for obvious error, concluded “willfully allowed” is consistent with statutory language and legislative history, held there was no unanimity problem because the statute lists alternative means, and affirmed sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether inserting “willfully” before “allowed” in the jury instruction was erroneous (obvious error review) | Instruction accurately tracked the statute and "willfully" can modify "allowed"; supported by statutory definitions and legislative history | "Willfully allowed" is incongruous; insertion altered requisite mens rea and was plain error | No error: "willfully allowed" is proper; not obvious error; instruction stands |
| Whether the jury had to be unanimous as to which alternative (inflict vs. allow) proved guilt | Alternatives are nonseparate means of committing the same offense; unanimity as to the single offense suffices | Different jurors could have found different means, violating unanimity requirement | No unanimity violation: alternatives are means (not separate elements); Schad and state precedent control |
| Whether evidence was insufficient to support conviction | Evidence permitted a reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in favor of the verdict | Evidence did not exclude reasonable doubt; insufficient as a matter of law | Sufficient evidence to support conviction; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1991) (alternative means may constitute a single offense so jury unanimity on the specific theory is not required)
- State v. Gaddie, 971 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 2022) (statutory interpretation principles and applying definitions across statutes)
- State v. Anderson, 480 N.W.2d 727 (N.D. 1992) ("willfully" requires volition/conscious conduct)
- State v. Trevino, 807 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 2011) (applying culpability definitions from one statute to another)
- State v. Pulkrabek, 900 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 2017) (alternative means/unanimity analysis for statutory offenses)
- State v. Rai, 924 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 2019) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
