438 P.3d 431
Or. Ct. App.2019Background
- At ~2:15 a.m. Deputy Childers observed defendant driving a pickup hauling ~3/4 cord of cut firewood with no visible permit or tag and stopped the vehicle to investigate under ORS 164.813(3).
- Childers (and the defendant) identified the wood as fir; Childers testified from training/experience that people sometimes cut wood during the day and retrieve it at night without permits.
- During the stop defendant admitted taking the wood from the forest and said he had a permit but left it at home; a records check then showed he was driving with a suspended license.
- Childers cited defendant for driving while suspended and for unlawfully transporting special forest products; defendant moved to suppress evidence from the stop arguing lack of reasonable suspicion.
- The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding the stop objectively reasonable (citing time of night and wood type); defendant was convicted after a jury trial and appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the deputy lacked the specific and articulable facts to reasonably suspect a violation of ORS 164.813(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant under Article I, §9 based on suspected violation of ORS 164.813(3) | State: time of night, type of wood (fir), and absence of visible permit made suspicion objectively reasonable | Defendant: statute prohibits transport only when conveying special forest products away from a harvest/collection site; officer lacked specific facts linking this load to such a site | Held: No. The officer's facts were too general and amounted to mere speculation; suppression denial was error |
| Proper construction of "transport" in ORS 164.813(1)(d) | State implicitly treated visible display/transport after dark as sufficient | Defendant: "transport" requires conveyance away from a harvest/collection site, so officer must have facts connecting load to such a site | Held: "Transport" means physical conveyance away from a harvest or collection site; permit requirement applies when conveying away from the source, not all movement of wood |
| Whether absence of visible permit supports reasonable suspicion | State argued visibility supported the stop | Defendant: statute requires possession, not visible display; absence of display is not proof of nonpossession | Held: Court rejected the asserted rule that permits must be visibly displayed and did not treat lack of display as dispositive |
| Whether analogy to State v. Crites supports the stop | State relied on Crites (wood after dark plus local theft problem) | Defendant distinguished Crites for lack of locality/theft problem and other connecting facts here | Held: Crites is distinguishable; that case included area-specific theft info and lack of permissible permits for that land, which here were absent |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or. 163 (recites standard of review and reasonable-suspicion framework)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (statutory construction principles)
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606 (statutory interpretation methodology)
- State v. Lively, 294 Or. App. 377 (applied Gaines/PGE to ORS 164.813 definitions)
- State v. Crites, 151 Or. App. 313 (stopped vehicle for wood after dark in area with known cedar thefts; distinguished here)