State v. Frey, 427 P.3d 86

Bruce Frey was convicted by a jury of three counts of child sexual assault based on alleged offenses from 2001–2006; judgment followed a January 2015 trial in Flathead County.
Pretrial, Frey moved to exclude evidence of seven prior convictions and earlier investigations; the court excluded prior bad acts except it allowed inquiry into Frey’s 1991 false-reporting convictions under M. R. Evid. 608(b) if he testified.
At trial Frey appeared using a cane and dark glasses; the State elicited testimony from various witnesses that Frey could see, drive, work, swim, and engage in outdoor activities during the alleged offense period; Frey did not object to most of this testimony.
Detective Tkachyk testified about 2010 and a later Utah trip observations suggesting Frey could see; Frey lodged only a non‑specific late objection to the Utah-trip testimony, which the court overruled.
Frey testified and disclosed his 1991 false-reporting convictions after the court read a cautionary instruction; the jury convicted on all counts.
Sentencing imposed $9,181.45 in prosecution/jury costs and a $30 technology fee per convicted count; Frey appealed evidentiary rulings and the costs/fees imposition.

Issue	Frey’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Admissibility of 1991 false-reporting convictions (motion in limine)	Convictions were remote and more prejudicial than probative under M. R. Evid. 403; should be excluded	Convictions go to truthfulness and are admissible on cross-exam under M. R. Evid. 608(b)	Court did not abuse discretion; limited admission under Rule 608(b) was permitted
Admission of testimony about Frey’s eyesight	State improperly used extrinsic evidence to attack credibility under Rule 608(b), evidence irrelevant, and it coerced Frey to testify	Most eyesight evidence was admitted without timely/specific objection; eyesight was relevant to whether Frey could have committed the crimes	Affirmed: most evidence was properly admitted; late non‑specific objection preserved little; any error harmless
Whether admission forced Frey to testify (right to remain silent)	Admission of credibility attacks forced Frey to testify to explain and waive privilege	Frey chose to testify as a strategic decision; court rulings did not coerce testimony	Court held Frey was not forced to testify; right not violated
Imposition of prosecution/jury costs and technology fees at sentencing	Trial court failed to consider Frey’s indigency before imposing costs; technology fee improperly assessed per count	State conceded errors on both points	Reversed and remanded for recalculation considering ability to pay and correct technology fee assessment

State v. Kaarma, 386 Mont. 243, 390 P.3d 609 (Mont. 2017) (district court has broad discretion on relevance and admissibility)
State v. MacGregor, 372 Mont. 142, 311 P.3d 428 (Mont. 2013) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Huerta, 285 Mont. 245, 947 P.2d 483 (Mont. 1997) (discretion presumed where multiple reasonable outcomes exist)
State v. Passmore, 355 Mont. 187, 225 P.3d 1229 (Mont. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard defined)
State v. Thompson, 366 Mont. 260, 286 P.3d 581 (Mont. 2012) (Rule 608(b) inquiry and limits on admission of specific acts)
State v. Martin, 279 Mont. 185, 926 P.2d 1380 (Mont. 1996) (remoteness affects credibility, not automatic inadmissibility)
State v. Azure, 308 Mont. 201, 41 P.3d 899 (Mont. 2002) (trial objections must be timely and specific to preserve appeal)
State v. Van Kirk, 306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735 (Mont. 2001) (harmless‑error standard for inadmissible evidence)
State v. Pope, 386 Mont. 194, 387 P.3d 870 (Mont. 2017) (assessment and limits of court technology fees)