State v. Fredrick
251 P.3d 48
Kan.2011Background
- Fredrick was adjudicated a Minnesota delinquent for acts constituting a sexually violent crime, requiring Minnesota registration as a predatory offender.
- He later moved to Kansas, and in 2008 was charged in Montgomery County with failing to report and verify under KORA.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding Fredrick was not required to register in Kansas.
- State seeks to prosecute under KORA, arguing Fredrick is an 'offender' and that 22-4906(i) governs the duration of registration.
- The court must determine whether Fredrick falls within KORA’s definition of offender and whether 22-4906 governs the registration duration applicable to his status.
- The Kansas Supreme Court analyzes the distinction between juvenile adjudications and adult convictions and the interaction with 22-4906(i) and 22-4906(h).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fredrick is an 'offender' under KORA | State: Fredrick qualifies as offender under 22-4902(a)(6) because he is required to register in Minnesota. | Fredrick: The Minnesota adjudication as a juvenile does not fall under adult-conviction provisions for registration time. | Yes, he is an offender, but time limits control. |
| Whether 22-4906(i) applies to Fredrick given juvenile adjudication | State: apply longer time based on other state's requirement; longer period applies. | Fredrick: 22-4906(i) covers convictions, not juvenile adjudications; cannot apply. | No; 22-4906(i) does not apply to a foreign juvenile adjudication. |
| Whether Kansas registration duration for juvenile adjudications governs Fredrick | State: public policy supports lifetime or extended registration to protect public. | Fredrick: legislature carved a specific juvenile-adjudication regime in 22-4906(h); cannot extend by policy. | No; 22-4906(h) governs juvenile-adjudication timelines and 22-4906(i) not applicable here. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41 (2010) (statutory interpretation is a question of law, unlimited review)
- State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68 (2000) (probable cause standard in dismissal appeals; view evidence as magistrate)
- State v. McElroy, 281 Kan. 256 (2006) (public policy considerations limited; strict statutory interpretation favored)
- State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603 (2000) (legislative intent and construction of KORA context)
- State v. Stevens, 26 Kan. App. 2d 606 (1999) (precedent on statutory interpretation and parole/public policy)