State v. Franks
2014 MT 273
| Mont. | 2014Background
- Victim C.L., then 15, reported in Dec. 2010 that she had been sexually assaulted by Jason Franks when she was 11; she later said a Dec. 3, 2010 newspaper article showing Franks prompted her to come forward.
- State charged Franks with sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault (one conviction later vacated by stipulation).
- Franks moved in limine to exclude mention of a prior 2010 charge (reported in the newspaper) as improper propensity evidence under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and unduly prejudicial under M. R. Evid. 403; the District Court allowed limited use — to explain C.L.’s delayed disclosure — and permitted Franks to introduce his acquittal to mitigate prejudice.
- At trial the prosecutor repeatedly referenced the article and characterized Franks as “accused of raping a little boy”; on cross-examination the prosecutor asked whether Franks heard his lawyer say “not guilty doesn’t mean innocent.”
- Franks was convicted; he moved for a new trial arguing the article evidence was more prejudicial than probative and the prosecutor misused it to imply propensity/that Franks was guilty of the prior charge. The District Court denied the new-trial motion; the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Franks) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of testimony about the newspaper article (Rule 404(b)) | Article testimony admissible to explain why C.L. disclosed after delay (non‑propensity purpose) | Article was impermissible propensity evidence and highly prejudicial | Court: Although potentially admissible for explaining disclosure, State misused it; ultimately exclusion should have been ordered under Rule 403 given prejudice |
| Rule 403 balancing (probative v. unfair prejudice) | Probative value: explains delayed disclosure and fits with expert testimony on disclosure patterns | Prejudicial effect: invited jury to infer Franks a child molester and punished for prior conduct | Held: Probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice because prosecutor’s repeated insinuations converted the evidence into impermissible propensity evidence; new trial required |
| Prosecutorial misuse / remedy | Prosecutor’s references were within narrative integrity to explain disclosure | Misuse transformed limited evidence into implication of prior guilt; cross-exam. undermined the protective effect of Franks’s acquittal | Held: Prosecutorial comments and questioning produced unfair prejudice; District Court abused its discretion in denying new trial |
| Sufficiency / double jeopardy (raised but not decided) | State: evidence sufficient; double jeopardy not implicated after vacatur | Franks: convictions not supported and double jeopardy concerns | Held: Court reversed on evidentiary/prejudice grounds and did not reach sufficiency or double jeopardy issues |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Brummer, 953 P.2d 250 (Mont. 1998) (new-trial review; abuse of discretion standard)
- State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187 (Mont. 2012) (Rule 404(b) admissibility principles; non‑propensity purposes)
- State v. Sage, 235 P.3d 1284 (Mont. 2010) (danger that inflammatory evidence may unduly prejudice jury)
- State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1978) (reversible error when prejudice substantially outweighs probative value)
- Havens v. State, 945 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1997) (after-trial reconsideration of prior evidentiary rulings may be required when promised proof is not presented)
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (limits on admitting prior-offense evidence when it unduly prejudices and undermines fairness)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (requirement that there be sufficient evidence that a prior act occurred when offered for non‑propensity purposes)