State v. Francis L. Lampman, 181 A.3d 54

At ~10:30 p.m. a witness observed Lampman moving roofing material at a Grand Isle construction site and later saw two persons load boxes of roofing material into an SUV; deputies stopped the vehicle and found the material inside. Lampman was passenger and gave inconsistent explanations. He admitted taking the material but denied entering the house.
The partially built house had framed walls, Tyvek wrapping, dormers without rafters, a first and second floor, and window/door openings without glass or doors; roofing material had been stored inside the first-floor stairwell per company policy.
At trial the State charged burglary (13 V.S.A. § 1201) and petit larceny; Lampman moved for acquittal arguing insufficient evidence of entry and that the structure was not a “building or structure.” The court denied the motions and instructed the jury that a building/structure can enclose space without necessarily having a roof.
The jury convicted on burglary and petit larceny. Lampman renewed motions for acquittal and a new trial, arguing the jury instruction was erroneous (no roof requirement) and that evidence was insufficient to show entry into a building/structure.
The Vermont Supreme Court considered (1) whether § 1201 requires a roof for a “building or structure,” and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Lampman entered a building/structure.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1201 requires a roof for a "building or structure"	State: statute uses "building or structure" per common meaning; no roof requirement shown	Lampman: statute should be read to require a roof/usable-as-intended enclosure	Court: No roof requirement; "structure" is broad and may include enclosures lacking roofs
Whether the jury instruction defining "building or structure" was erroneous	State: instruction accurately reflected law and left fact-finding to jury	Lampman: instruction improperly allowed conviction despite lack of roof, relieving State of burden	Court: Instruction was proper; framed definition and left element to jury
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant entered the structure	State: manager testimony placed materials inside stairwell and eyewitness saw material moved from house area; circumstantial evidence supports entry	Lampman: denied entering; said material was on grass outside	Court: Circumstantial evidence and manager's testimony sufficed to prove entry beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether expansive reading impermissibly broadens burglary beyond common law	State: Legislature has broadened burglary protections beyond habitation; overlapping statutes acceptable	Lampman: expansion is improper and creates overlap	Court: Expansion is consistent with statute and modern burglary law; overlapping statutes permissible

State v. Snow, 70 A.3d 971 (Vt. 2013) (reviews jury instruction standards and statutory interpretation)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (explaining common-law burglary elements and historical focus on dwelling)
People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App.) (assessing expectation of protection from unauthorized intrusion in structures)
State v. Roadhs, 430 P.2d 586 (Wash. 1967) (fence and enclosed compound can qualify as a "structure")
People v. Moyer, 635 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (fenced enclosure serving protective function can be an "occupied structure")