148 Conn. App. 788
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Victim Tashima Reddick was found dead from multiple sharp-force injuries on Nov. 1–2, 2008; autopsy found ~75 wounds and death from blood loss; no single wound was independently fatal.
- Defendant owned a Volvo in which victim’s blood, hair and a water bottle with her DNA were found; neighbor observed a man place a female in a Volvo and drive away; defendant purchased/used two Volvos that day and gave an account to detectives.
- On Nov. 2, 2008 defendant was taken to hospital, then to police station where detectives interviewed him without Miranda warnings (he was not under arrest); later a search warrant was executed requiring DNA buccal swab and clothing seizure.
- Defendant was arrested June 26, 2009; competency proceedings followed: initially found incompetent but restorable; later judges (Gold; Alexander) found him competent (diagnosed as malingering); trial began Feb. 2012.
- During trial: defense sought additional competency exams (denied); defendant elected to testify after the court canvass and counsel warned they might be effectively "standby"; a juror was excused after indicating curiosity about weather and possible premature deliberation; jury later asked for clarification on "intent" and received supplemental instructions before returning a guilty verdict for murder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suppression — were pre-arrest stationhouse statements inadmissible because Miranda warnings were required after execution of a search warrant? | State: defendant was not in custody; interview was voluntary and Miranda not required. | Francis: execution of warrant during interview converted it into custodial interrogation; hence statements after that point were unprotected. | Court: defendant failed to prove custodial interrogation; record did not show statements occurred after warrant execution; suppression denial affirmed. |
| Pretrial competency — did Judge Gold err in finding defendant competent to stand trial? | State: relied on evaluations and defendant’s volitional refusal to cooperate supported competency finding. | Francis: court improperly treated his refusal to participate as evidence of competency and penalized invocation of silence. | Court: refusal was volitional and not an invocation of Fifth Amendment; reliance on that conduct was proper; competency ruling upheld. |
| Mid-trial competency requests — should court have ordered further competency exams during trial? | State: recent reports found defendant malingering and competent; no change in behavior to raise reasonable doubt. | Francis: trial behavior (odd garbling, lack of engagement) raised reasonable doubt; additional exam warranted. | Court: abuse-of-discretion review — trial court reasonably denied further exams given recent reports and its own observations; request denied. |
| Right to testify vs. right to counsel — did court force defendant to choose between counsel and testifying? | State: court properly canvassed defendant; clinicians found competence; counsel only warned of consequences. | Francis: court conditioned his right to testify on waiver of counsel and allowed counsel to abandon him. | Court: no improper coercion; defendant unequivocally chose to testify; court canvassed him and appointed standby counsel; claim fails. |
| Juror dismissal & supplemental intent instruction — was juror excused improperly and did supplemental instruction expand charge to uncharged theory (failure to render aid)? | State: judge reasonably concluded juror had begun premature deliberation; intent instructions (including that post-offense conduct is admissible for inference) were correct. | Francis: excusal deprived him of the original empaneled jury; jury seemed to consider post-infliction failure-to-help theory not charged. | Court: excusal within discretionary authority; supplemental instructions legally correct and did not broaden the charged offense; conviction affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings)
- Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (Fifth Amendment privilege must be affirmatively claimed; silence alone is not invocation)
- State v. Jackson, 304 Conn. 383 (2012) (custody inquiry: objective reasonable-person test; free-to-leave analysis)
- State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51 (2012) (post-offense conduct may be used to infer intent at time of offense)
- State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1 (2010) (premature juror deliberation and juror credibility assessments are for the trial court)
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989) (standards for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)