State v. Foster, 493 P.3d 283

Background

On July 9, 2018, David Payne was shot outside a garage where Shannon Allison, Joshua Anno, and Tony Foster were present; Payne later died. Witnesses Anno and Allison placed Foster at the scene and testified he shot Payne; a jailhouse inmate testified Foster admitted shooting someone and disposing of the gun.
Foster was arrested, interviewed by police (initial denials, then admitted presence but denied shooting), and charged with second-degree intentional murder (alternative reckless murder) and criminal possession of a firearm as a convicted felon.
The case was set for trial March 11, 2019, but the court failed to summon jurors and could not reschedule a jury before Foster’s speedy-trial deadline (April 5); the court invoked the statutory "crowded docket" exception and continued trial to April 8 over Foster’s objection.
Foster moved to exclude the videotaped interrogation as improper comment on credibility; the court ordered redactions to portions but admitted a redacted video at trial after Foster renewed a general objection.
The jury convicted Foster of second-degree reckless murder and criminal possession of a weapon. On appeal Foster raised three claims: improper use of the crowded-docket tolling provision; erroneous admission of the interrogation video; and a constitutional challenge to the felon-in-possession statute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: it construed the crowded-docket exception broadly to cover situations where the court cannot reschedule within the speedy-trial deadline because of docket constraints; it found Foster failed to preserve specific evidentiary objections to the video and that the admitted portions were not improper; and it declined, on prudential grounds, to consider Foster’s constitutional challenge (a concurrence would have considered and rejected it on the merits).

Issues

Issue	Foster's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Applicability of the "crowded docket" speedy-trial toll (K.S.A. 22-3402(e)(4))	The exception applies only when the continuance itself is due to a crowded docket (i.e., court continued trial because docket was full).	The statutory language covers situations where the court cannot reschedule a trial within the speedy-trial deadline because of other cases pending; it need not be the immediate cause of the continuance.	The exception applies; court may rely on it where the court cannot commence trial within the deadline due to other matters on the docket. Affirmed.
Admissibility of videotaped interrogation (impermissible credibility commentary)	Detective’s statements, sarcastic tone, and body language improperly commented on Foster’s credibility; video should have been excluded in whole.	State redacted specific challenged statements; remaining tone and gestures were limited and relevant; moreover Foster failed to preserve specific objections to unredacted portions.	Admission was not error: Foster waived specific objections by not identifying all challenged statements; remaining tone/body language did not cross line in Elnicki; video properly admitted.
Constitutionality of felon-in-possession statute (K.S.A. 21-6304(a)(2))	Section 4 of Kansas Constitution protects right to possess arms and contains no express limit on possession, so statute criminalizing possession by felons conflicts with section 4.	The 2010 text of section 4 limits the right to "lawful purposes," and the Legislature long has and may proscribe unlawful possession (including felons); courts routinely uphold felon-in-possession laws.	Issue not considered on merits (waived/unpreserved on appeal); concurrence would have reached and rejected the facial challenge, finding the statute consistent with section 4 and federal precedent.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140 (Kan. 2009) (review standard for statutory speedy-trial claims)
State v. Coburn, 220 Kan. 750 (Kan. 1976) (rejecting absurd scheduling formalities; courts should address docket constraints directly)
State v. Mansaw, 279 Kan. 309 (Kan. 2005) (supreme court adopted appellate panel’s application of crowded-docket tolling)
State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12 (Kan. 2021) (district court must extend or continue the time for trial for the crowded-docket exception to apply)
State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47 (Kan. 2005) (law enforcement may not expressly vouch that defendant is lying; comments on credibility are restricted)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to bear arms but is not unlimited; longstanding prohibitions may be presumptively lawful)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment to the states; reiteration that certain prohibitions are presumptively lawful)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial-challenge standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances in which statute would be valid)
State v. Watson, 273 Kan. 426 (Kan. 2002) (discussing facial challenges to statutes)
State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419 (Kan. 2009) (preservation requirement: timely and specific objection needed to preserve evidentiary issues for appeal)
State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526 (Kan. 2019) (court must identify a clear constitutional violation before striking statute)