State v. Flynn
2017 Ohio 1484
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Jenifer Flynn was served with a summons on April 28, 2016, for a second-degree misdemeanor (obstructing official business); arraignment continued to May 5, 2016 so she could obtain counsel.
- Court appointed counsel was selected May 5; the court tolled speedy-trial time until a pretrial conference set for May 26, 2016.
- A bench trial was scheduled for July 6, 2016; on that date the State dismissed the charge without prejudice and refiled a higher-charge falsification complaint on July 8, 2016 (same facts).
- Flynn was served with a summons on the refiled complaint (July 11), requested continuances on July 27 and again at arraignment, and a bench trial was held September 21, 2016.
- Flynn moved to dismiss under R.C. 2945.73(B) for violation of the 90-day speedy-trial limit; she argued 97 days had accrued, while the State and trial court calculated 77 days.
- The trial court denied discharge, convicted Flynn of falsification, and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Flynn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the September 21, 2016 trial exceeded the 90-day speedy-trial limit under R.C. 2945.71–.73 | The elapsed speedy-trial time was 77 days (within 90 days); various continuances and the dismissal/refiling tolled time appropriately | 97 days had run by trial; certain tolled periods were improper (e.g., May 5–26) and dismissal/refiling did not preserve prior running days | Affirmed: only 77 days accrued; trial was timely under R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) and court did not err denying discharge |
| Whether the sua sponte continuance from May 5 to May 26 was reasonable under R.C. 2945.72(H) | The continuance was reasonable because counsel was not present and the court set the next available date for appointed counsel | The continuance improperly tolled time; defense contends tolling should only begin on discovery request (May 20) | Held reasonable: record shows continuance was prompted by defendant's lack of counsel and scheduled around counsel’s availability; time did not accrue during May 5–26 |
| Effect of dismissal without prejudice (July 6) and refiling (July 8) on speedy-trial computation | Dismissal tolled time while complaint was dismissed; because refiling arose from same facts, previously accrued days continue to count | Dismissal/refiling should not allow State to avoid speedy-trial limits to accumulate more days | Held: dismissal without prejudice tolled time between dismissal and refiling, but pre-dismissal accrued days still count toward speedy-trial tally; overall calculation remained within 90 days |
| Whether the trial court satisfied the requirement to set forth reasons for sua sponte continuances | The record (oral motion, scheduling context, journal entry) affirmatively demonstrates reasons and reasonableness despite not detailing them in the entry | Argues the journal entry lacked explicit reasons as required by precedent | Held: although journal entry did not recite detailed reasons, the record otherwise affirmatively demonstrates the reasons and reasonableness (citing Ramey and related authority) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Maisch, 173 Ohio App.3d 724 (Ohio App. 2007) (date a summons is served does not count as an accrued speedy-trial day)
- State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253 (Ohio 1991) (dismissal without prejudice tolls speedy-trial time while the complaint is dismissed)
- State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67 (Ohio 1989) (when charges refiled on same facts, pre-dismissal accrued time still counts)
- State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 (Ohio 1982) (trial court must enter continuance and reasons by journal entry before speedy-trial time expires for sua sponte continuances)
- State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309 (Ohio 2012) (appellate courts may affirm speedy-trial rulings even when the trial court did not expressly enumerate reasons if the record otherwise demonstrates reasonableness)