State v. Fleckenstein, 907 N.W.2d 365

Background

Deputy Braun stopped Tyler Fleckenstein after his vehicle touched the center line; Fleckenstein had bloodshot eyes and admitted drinking "a few beers."
Fleckenstein performed three field sobriety tests; he then consented to a preliminary breath test which indicated BAC above the legal limit.
Braun arrested Fleckenstein, read Miranda warnings, and read an implied-consent advisory stating North Dakota law requires submission to a chemical test and describing license-suspension penalties for refusal.
After the officer re-read that the law "requires you to submit to a chemical test," Fleckenstein consented to a blood test.
Fleckenstein was charged with third-offense DUI and moved to suppress the blood test; the district court granted the motion, finding consent involuntary based solely on the advisory.
The State appealed; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the district court misapplied the law by treating the advisory as per se coercive instead of assessing voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether consent to blood draw was voluntary	State: consent was voluntary; implied-consent advisory and circumstances did not render consent coerced	Fleckenstein: advisory wording ("law requires you") made consent involuntary because it implied a criminal penalty	Reversed and remanded — voluntariness must be decided under the totality of the circumstances; district court erred by treating advisory as per se coercive
Whether reading an accurate implied-consent advisory alone coerces consent	State: accurate advisory does not automatically coerce consent	Fleckenstein: advisory created coercion by implying legal compulsion	Court: an accurate advisory is not per se coercive; totality analysis required
Applicability of Birchfield to advisory here	State: advisory did not state criminal penalty so Birchfield’s per se rule (for criminal penalties) does not control	Fleckenstein: advisory wording could be read as criminal compulsion despite absence of criminal-penalty language	Court: Birchfield forbids deeming consent involuntary solely because of advisory that threatens criminal penalty; here advisory referenced only administrative penalties, so Birchfield does not resolve voluntariness and totality test governs
Burden of proof on voluntariness	State: must prove voluntariness by preponderance	Fleckenstein: consent was involuntary and suppression appropriate	Court: State bears burden; remand for district court to apply totality-of-the-circumstances test and make findings

Key Cases Cited

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (warrantless blood tests unreasonable; motorists cannot be criminally punished for refusing blood test; voluntariness after advisory requires case-specific inquiry)
State v. Boehm, 849 N.W.2d 239 (N.D. 2014) (limits on State’s right to appeal suppression orders)
McCoy v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 848 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 2014) (accurate implied-consent advisory about administrative penalties does not alone render consent coerced)
State v. Fetch, 855 N.W.2d 389 (N.D. 2014) (same principle regarding advisories referencing criminal penalties)
State v. Hawkins, 898 N.W.2d 446 (N.D. 2017) (consent held involuntary under totality of circumstances where advisory referenced criminal penalty and defendant was handcuffed and confined before consenting)
State v. Syvertson, 597 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 1999) (totality-of-the-circumstances factors for voluntariness)