State v. Flanagan
82 A.3d 1191
Conn. App. Ct.2013Background
- Maurice Flanagan was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree; earlier convictions on related charges were vacated and retried. After the state rested at the second trial, Flanagan asked to proceed pro se to call three witnesses. Trial Judge Shortall denied the request.
- Flanagan appealed; the Appellate Court affirmed. The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification, held Flanagan had clearly and unequivocally invoked his Faretta right post-commencement, rejected the trial court’s use of an “exceptional circumstances” test, and remanded for application of a balancing test.
- The Supreme Court directed the trial court, on remand, to consider three factors for midtrial Faretta requests: (1) defendant’s reasons for seeking self-representation; (2) quality of defendant’s counsel; and (3) defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel; if the balance favored the defendant, a Practice Book § 44-3 canvass was required; if not, denial without canvass was permissible.
- On remand Judge D’Addabbo held a hearing, reviewed transcripts and witness proffers, and concluded Flanagan’s request should be denied because the potential disruption to a trial well underway outweighed his interest in self-representation; no § 44-3 canvass was required.
- Key considerations by the trial court: the proposed witnesses were neither new nor clearly exculpatory; counsel (Stawicki) had performed competently; prior requests to substitute counsel were minimal and not disruptive; permitting pro se representation at that stage would likely delay the trial, risk losing jurors, and disrupt trial strategy.
Issues
| Issue | Flanagan's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court on remand should have canvassed Flanagan under Practice Book § 44-3 after he invoked Faretta post-commencement | Flanagan: Having clearly and unequivocally invoked his right, he was entitled to a § 44-3 canvass; the court should not have denied canvass absent a finding that his Faretta right outweighed disruption concerns | State: Under the Supreme Court’s remand, the trial court must first apply the balancing test; if disruption outweighs the interest, denial without canvass is proper | Held: Court properly applied balancing test and concluded disruption outweighed interest; no § 44-3 canvass required |
| Whether the trial court erred by considering the quality of counsel as a balancing factor | Flanagan: Quality-of-counsel is irrelevant here because his reason (to call witnesses) was legitimate and not premised on counsel incompetence; trial judge on remand lacked firsthand observation of trial | State: Supreme Court expressly directed consideration of counsel quality; it is relevant to assessing whether pro se representation is necessary | Held: Consideration of counsel quality was proper and required by the Supreme Court’s mandate; the remand court reasonably found counsel competent |
| Whether the court misweighed Flanagan’s reasons for wanting to go pro se (to call witnesses) | Flanagan: His reason was legitimate and should have weighed in his favor; the court improperly evaluated the likely efficacy/admissibility of the witnesses rather than deferring to the asserted right | State: The court may evaluate whether the proposed testimony is material, admissible, and likely to affect outcome because disruption must be justified by more than a facially legitimate reason | Held: Court correctly analyzed the proffered witnesses, found limited value and disclosure problems, and reasonably concluded the reasons did not tip the balance in favor of Faretta |
| Whether the court overstated the potential disruption (delay, juror loss, strategic interference) | Flanagan: The court exaggerated delay risk and improperly relied on interference with counsel’s trial strategy as a basis to deny pro se representation | State: Delay, juror attrition, need for state rebuttal, and interruption to trial management are legitimate disruption considerations for an untimely Faretta request | Held: Court’s disruption concerns were reasonable and within its discretion; denial was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes constitutional right to self-representation and grounds for denying untimely or obstructive requests)
- Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1994) (articulates balancing factors for midtrial Faretta requests: reasons for request, quality of counsel, prior proclivity to substitute counsel)
- State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406 (2009) (CT Supreme Court: defendant clearly invoked Faretta post-commencement; directs remand with balancing test and canvass rule)
- State v. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215 (1989) (discusses Faretta principles in Connecticut jurisprudence)
- State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222 (2013) (upholds trial court discretion in denying untimely pro se requests when reasons are uncompelling relative to disruption)