State v. Figures
957 N.W.2d 161
Neb.2021Background
- Defendant Phillip Figures was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and felony use of a firearm for the July 15, 2018 killing of Fredrick Green; sentence: life plus 40–50 years consecutive.
- State’s case relied principally on Vanessa (Figures’ then-wife), who testified Figures admitted involvement and described events; her testimony was corroborated by police investigation, autopsy, DNA testing, cell-phone data/metadata, video surveillance, and other witnesses.
- Defense emphasized alternative perpetrator theory (Akil Williams), eliciting testimony about Williams’ relationship with the victim, flight from the scene, and alleged motive; Figures did not testify or present his own witnesses.
- Pretrial and trial disputes included Figures’ repeated motions to replace appointed counsel, a request to possess physical discovery while incarcerated, last‑minute witness disclosures, and evidentiary fights over threats, an alleged failed drug deal, doorbell-camera footage, and officers’ recounting of Vanessa’s statements.
- During trial the court dismissed a juror mid‑trial for suspected improper contact, Figures left the courtroom voluntarily for part of testimony, the State played disputed doorbell footage, and Figures moved for a mistrial after closing; appellate counsel raised numerous ineffective-assistance claims based on trial counsel’s strategy and omissions.
Issues
| Issue | Figures' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel removal | Counsel was incompetent; court applied too strict a standard and should have appointed new counsel | Figures failed to show good cause; mere dissatisfaction insufficient | Court did not abuse discretion; no good‑cause shown for substitute counsel |
| Physical copies of discovery | As an incarcerated defendant, Figures needed physical copies to meaningfully consult discovery | Local practice allowed dissemination via counsel; statute permits inspection but does not require providing copies to incarcerated defendant | Denial of physical possession not an abuse of discretion |
| Mid‑trial juror dismissal (only African‑American juror) | Dismissal lacked record support and implicated Batson concerns | Court had factual basis (juror contradictions, possible contact); dismissal for cause, not peremptory | Court did not abuse discretion; no Batson violation |
| Presentation of State’s case while Figures absent | Right to be present violated; absence was not knowingly waived | Figures voluntarily left the courtroom and thus waived right to be present for that portion | Waiver was voluntary; no error |
| Admission of character evidence (threats/drug deal) and officers repeating Vanessa’s statements | Threats and drug deal testimony were improper character evidence; officers’ repetition of Vanessa’s statements was hearsay | Threats were admissible as inextricably intertwined; drug deal not presented; officers’ testimony cumulative | Failed‑to‑object waived the threats claim; officers’ hearsay was error but harmless given cumulative testimony and other evidence |
| Motion for mistrial after rebuttal comments | Prosecutor’s rebuttal improperly suggested defense misled jury, warranting mistrial | Comments were hyperbolic, not prejudicial in context of the whole trial | Even if improper, remarks were isolated and not prejudicial; mistrial denial affirmed |
| Sufficiency of the evidence (corroboration of confession) | Vanessa’s account was essentially a confession and required corroboration under Scott | State produced independent corroboration (forensics, phone metadata, video, physical evidence, autopsy) | Evidence was sufficient for reasonable juror to convict |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (multiple specific claims) | Trial counsel failed to pursue continuances, object to/disqualify evidence, rigorously cross‑examine key witnesses, seek experts, present alibi, or move for new trial | Many alleged omissions lack record context, some objections would have been futile, and several claims were insufficiently specific on direct appeal | On the record, appellate court either found claims unsupported, waived, speculative, or insufficiently specific; no reversible IAC established |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes and frames burden shifting for such claims)
- State v. Bratton, 187 Neb. 460 (Neb. 1971) (discusses standards for substitution or removal of appointed counsel)
- State v. Mrza, 302 Neb. 931 (Neb. 2019) (requires specificity in ineffective‑assistance assignments on direct appeal)
- State v. Scott, 200 Neb. 265 (Neb. 1977) (a voluntary confession needs slight corroboration to establish corpus delicti and guilt)
- State v. Huff, 298 Neb. 522 (Neb. 2017) (trial court has broad discretion to discharge juror for cause when impartiality is doubtful)
- State v. Clausen, 307 Neb. 968 (Neb. 2020) (standards for deciding ineffective‑assistance claims on direct appeal)
- State v. Sundquist, 301 Neb. 1006 (Neb. 2019) (defendant need not allege prejudice on direct appeal but must specify counsel’s deficient acts)
- State v. Parnell, 294 Neb. 551 (Neb. 2016) (evidence inextricably intertwined with charged offense may be admissible despite character‑evidence rules)
- Crowder v. Aurora Co‑op Elevator Co., 223 Neb. 704 (Neb. 1986) (standards for admissibility of summaries/exhibits derived from voluminous underlying records)
