State v. Fierro
2014 S.D. 62
| S.D. | 2014Background
- On Aug. 4, 2013, Troopers stopped Shauna Fierro for a traffic violation, arrested her for DUI, and, while processing at the county jail, required a blood draw under SDCL 32-23-10.
- Fierro told officers she wanted to refuse and consult an attorney, physically pulled away on an initial attempt, and the blood sample was nevertheless taken by a county technician.
- Trooper Kastein did not seek or obtain consent and later testified he provided no choice; he was aware of and trained on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely.
- Fierro moved to suppress the blood evidence; the magistrate court granted suppression, finding no consent and no exigent circumstances and concluding SDCL 32-23-10 could not be applied to justify a mandatory, warrantless blood draw post-McNeely.
- The State appealed the intermediate order; the South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the warrantless blood draw under SDCL 32-23-10 was unconstitutional and whether the good-faith exception to exclusion applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless compelled blood draw under SDCL 32-23-10 is constitutional post-McNeely | Legislature can condition driving privilege on irrevocable consent; statute authorizes mandatory blood draws without warrant | Fierro did not consent; statute cannot override Fourth Amendment; McNeely requires case-by-case exigency analysis | SDCL 32-23-10 does not, by itself, permit mandatory warrantless blood draws; the warrantless draw here violated the Fourth Amendment and SD constitution |
| Whether exigent-circumstances justified warrantless blood draw | Natural dissipation of alcohol creates exigency permitting warrantless draws (pre-McNeely precedent) | McNeely rejects per se exigency based solely on alcohol dissipation; State failed to prove exigency here | No exigent circumstances shown; McNeely controls; exigency not established |
| Whether Fierro’s submission constituted voluntary consent under Fourth Amendment | Statute implies consent; submission to draw equates to consent | Record shows verbal and physical refusal; submission under authority is not voluntary consent | No voluntary consent; submission under coercion is insufficient; consent was revoked prior to completion |
| Whether the good-faith exception permits admission of blood evidence | Officer reasonably relied on SDCL 32-23-10 and pre-McNeely practice; suppression not warranted | Officer knew McNeely and had training; reliance on prior precedent was not objectively reasonable here | Good-faith exception inapplicable because officer was aware of McNeely; deterrence supports suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (compelled blood draws are Fourth Amendment searches requiring reasonableness analysis)
- Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (intrusions into the body implicate strong privacy interests)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (approved warrantless blood draw under exigent circumstances on the facts presented)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search must be voluntary under the totality of circumstances)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency; exigency requires case-by-case analysis)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good-faith reliance on binding precedent can justify admission; exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale limits suppression)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good-faith exception may apply to reliance on a statute later held invalid, subject to limits)
- Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (state may impose conditions on privileges but cannot condition away constitutional rights)
- Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (invalidated nonconsensual medical testing conducted to generate evidence for law enforcement)