State v. Fernando, 996 N.W.2d 630

Victim (born 2006) testified that from age 11 Flores, her mother’s husband (not biological father), repeatedly sexually penetrated her; assaults continued into adolescence.
Victim became pregnant at about 12; Fernando (mother) arranged and accompanied her to an abortion, instructed the victim to say the father was a schoolboy, and signed parental consent forms.
The victim disclosed the abuse to Fernando multiple times; Fernando continued to keep Flores in the home and later told the victim to deny the abuse to police and at a child advocacy interview.
Police investigation followed a friend’s report in January 2021; Fernando hugged Flores when he left after officers arrived and attempted to contact him afterward; investigators found period trackers and a call attempt on Fernando’s phone.
Fernando was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of intentional child abuse (Class IIIA felonies) and one count of accessory to first-degree sexual assault of a child (Class IIA felony); district court found the victim credible and Fernando less so.
Court affirmed convictions but modified sentence by striking post-release supervision as plain error because concurrent Class IIA sentencing precluded PRS for the Class IIIA convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency — intentional child abuse (permitting sexual abuse)	State: Evidence shows Fernando knew of Flores’ assaults and intentionally permitted victim to remain with assailant.	Fernando: Her inaction, at most, was negligent/reckless, not intentional; inaction cannot be an intentional act.	Affirmed: Intent can be inferred from words/acts; permitting via deliberate inaction supports intentional child abuse.
Sufficiency — accessory to first-degree sexual assault of a child	State: Fernando arranged abortion, coached victim to misidentify father, and urged denials to investigators, showing intent to hinder prosecution.	Fernando: Victim chose abortion; clinic actions independent; no proof Flores was father or that Fernando knew he was.	Affirmed: Circumstantial evidence supported inference Fernando intended to prevent discovery/prosecution.
Plain error — sentencing post-release supervision (PRS)	State: Court should correct sentencing error sua sponte because PRS was legally precluded when Class IIIA sentence runs concurrent with Class IIA.	(Fernando did not preserve at trial)	Modified: PRS struck as plain error—concurrent sentencing to Class IIA bars PRS for Class IIIA convictions.

State v. Thelen, 305 Neb. 334 (Neb. 2020) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
State v. Olbricht, 294 Neb. 974 (Neb. 2016) (statute covers permitting abuse without physical presence)
State v. Blair, 272 Neb. 951 (Neb. 2007) (distinguishing negligent from intentional child abuse by mens rea)
State v. Meyer, 236 Neb. 253 (Neb. 1990) (intent may be inferred from words, acts, and circumstances)
State v. Guzman, 305 Neb. 376 (Neb. 2020) (plain-error doctrine requirements)
State v. Nichols, 363 P.3d 1187 (N.M. 2016) (distinguishing causing vs permitting child abuse)