State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586

Background

Ferguson convicted of one count drive-by shooting at an occupied building and eight counts of second-degree assault arising from a single incident involving eight occupants.
District court sentenced on the eight assault counts but not on the drive-by shooting conviction, finding the drive-by shooting was part of a continuing course of conduct.
Court of Appeals remanded, holding Minn. Stat. § 609.035 required sentencing only on the drive-by shooting conviction; it barred the eight assault sentences.
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the district court may sentence on multiple offenses under the so‑called multiple‑victim exception and that a single drive-by shooting conviction is not commensurate with Ferguson’s culpability for eight fear-inducing assaults.
Majority concluded the single drive-by shooting offense does not constitute a crime against each building occupant for purposes of 609.035; the state may impose multiple sentences, including eight assaults, for separate victims.
Dissent urged that occupants are victims of the drive-by shooting and that the multiple‑victim exception does not apply to a victimless crime; would affirm the Court of Appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 609.035 prevents multiple sentences for incidents with multiple victims.	State argued the multiple‑victim exception permits one sentence per victim.	Ferguson argued only the most serious offense may be sentenced under 609.035; occupants should be treated as victims for per‑victim sentencing.	Yes for majority; the offense here is not per‑victim, but the court may still impose multiple sentences under the exception.
Is a single drive-by shooting at an occupied building a crime against each occupant under the exception?	State contends occupants are victims of the drive-by shooting.	Ferguson contends occupants are not victims of the drive-by shooting under the statute.	No; a single count does not constitute a crime against each occupant for purposes of 609.035.
If not per occupant, is the district court’s aggregate 75‑month sentence permissible?	State supported combined sentences to reflect culpability.	Ferguson argued the sentence should reflect only the most serious offense.	Yes; the district court’s sentence is permissible and not limited to the most serious offense.
Does the majority’s reasoning create conflicts with prior victim‑per‑victim sentencing jurisprudence?	State relies on existing multiple‑victim exceptions.	Dissent cautions against treating victimless offenses as enabling multiple sentences.	The majority’s approach is narrowly tailored to this case and does not overrule core precedents.
Does Edwards or similar cases foreclose treating an occupied-building drive-by shooting as victimful?	State relies on precedent recognizing multiple victims.	Dissent argues victims exist in occupants and that the exception should apply more broadly.	Not controlling; the majority reasons drive-by shooting at an occupied building is not per‑victim under 609.035.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 1986) (purpose of 609.035 is to proportion punishment to culpability)
State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2006) (exception to 609.035; most serious offense rule with single incident)
State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2009) (reaffirms per‑victim sentencing principle under 609.035)
State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 2006) (two‑victim rule; governs when multiple victims exist)
State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 2009) (one sentence per victim; supports per‑victim approach when victims exist)
State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353 (Minn. 1968) (explanation of 609.035 purpose and exceptions)
State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1983) (recognizes victims may exist despite absent intent in certain crimes)
State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1979) (tampering/victim presence considerations for victims not strictly required)