State v. Ferdinand
371 S.W.3d 844
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Ferdinand indicted for forcible rape and sexual assault in 1993 (First Filing) based on March 18, 1993 incident; Victim identified Ferdinand.
- DNA testing in 1993-94 was inconclusive; charges dismissed after DNA results.
- A second indictment (Second Filing) in 1994 followed, with speedy-trial demand; charges dismissed after inconclusive DNA.
- DNA technology advanced in 2009; remaining DNA sample tested, Ferdinand identified as semen source.
- A third indictment (Third Filing) filed in 2010; trial set for 2011; Ferdinand asserted speedy-trial rights.
- Bench trial in 2011; stipulation of facts admitted sexual intercourse by Ferdinand without consent; he was convicted and sentenced to seven years concurrent with an unrelated sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the speedy-trial violation was proven under Barker factors | Ferdinand asserts 24-month delay; seventeen-year frame | State delayed for DNA reasons; delays partially Ferdinand’s fault | No abuse of discretion; delay presumptively prejudicial but outweighed by reasons and lack of prejudice |
| Whether the pre-indictment delay violated due process under the Fifth Amendment | Delay caused substantial prejudice and tactical advantage | Delay due to DNA investigation; not purposeful for tactical gain; prejudice not substantial | No due-process violation; State delayed to obtain conclusive DNA evidence; no substantial prejudice established |
| Whether Ferdinand’s assertion of speedy-trial rights was properly weighed | Right asserted after Third Filing; timely assertion required | Delay attenuated by Ferdinand’s late assertion; not clearly against him | No reversible error; assertion timing did not mandate dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Buchli v. State, 152 S.W.3d 289 (Mo.App. W.D. 2004) (presumptive prejudice threshold and calculation of delay; continuances attributed to defendant)
- Dillard v. State, 931 S.W.2d 157 (Mo.App. W.D. 1996) (speedy-trial rights; relevance of pre-indictment delay)
- Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907 (Mo. banc 2010) (Sixth Amendment speedy-trial framework; Barker factors application)
- Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1987) (distinction between pre-indictment delay and post-indictment proceedings)
- Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (when protections attach for speedy-trial purposes)
- State v. Newman, 256 S.W.3d 210 (Mo.App. W.D. 2008) (weighing Barker factors; delay and prejudice)
- State v. Davis, 903 S.W.2d 930 (Mo.App. W.D. 1995) (DNA-delay justifications; neutral vs. deliberate delay)
- State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602 (Mo.App. E.D. 2010) (prejudice and burden of showing actual prejudice)
- U.S. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 788 (1977) (investigative delay not necessarily tactical delay; due-process considerations)
- State ex rel. Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907 (Mo. banc 2010) (Sixth Amendment applicable; pre-indictment rights)