State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193

Faruqi was convicted of attempted enticement of a child after undercover sting where the ‘child’ was a police officer posing as a 14-year-old.
He challenged the statute 566.151 as vague under due process, relying on subsection 2 declaring no affirmative defense for officer masquerading as a minor.
The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss; Faruqi proceeded to bench trial where he testified he believed Kaitlin was an adult and that chats were fantasy.
Detective Osterloh conducted a Miranda-compliant interview; Faruqi provided oral and later written statements and consent to search his workplace computer.
Police seized the computer and found fragments corroborating the chats; Faruqi was charged by indictment with attempted enticement of a child.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 566.151 is void for vagueness as applied	Faruqi argues subsections 1–2 are ambiguously drafting (subsection 2 mislabels as affirmative defense).	State asserts subsections 1 clearly prohibit enticing under 15; subsection 2 merely states the victim being a police officer is not an affirmative defense.	Vagueness challenges fail; applied to attempted enticement, the statute is valid.
Whether Faruqi's statements to police were involuntary	Statements were coerced by implied threats and deception.	Totality of circumstances show voluntariness; misrepresentation about a 14-year-old complaint is not per se coercive.	Statements were voluntary; no coercion or constitutional violation.
Whether computer-evidence search violated Fourth Amendment rights	Faruqi had a privacy interest in the work computer; search was unlawful.	He consented to the search of the computer; standing issues foreclose the claim.	No standing; because Faruqi consented to search, Fourth Amendment claim barred.
Whether the attempt statute supports liability despite actual victim being a police officer	Under subsection 2, the use of an officer masquerading as a minor could negate liability for attempt.	Under §564.011.2, the goal is the defendant's purpose and substantial step, regardless of the victim's true identity.	Applicant's attempt liability valid; belief of minor suffices to support attempted enticement.

State v. Pribble, 285 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. banc 2009) (vagueness of enticement statute previously rejected)
State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468 (Mo. banc 2011) (as-applied vagueness analysis for statutes)
State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756 (Mo. banc 2005) (limitations on vagueness and standing interpretations)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1977) (distinction between affirmative defense and ordinary defense)
Morales v. City of Chicago, 527 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1999) (morality-based loitering statutes and facial vagueness)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1939) (due process notice requirement for penal statutes)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (void-for-vagueness doctrine tolerates imperfection but requires definite notice)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978) (personal standing; requires actual privacy interest)
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (U.S. 2010) (analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy in electronic communications)
State v. Hall, 321 S.W.3d 453 (Mo. App. 2010) (statutory interpretation of enticement-related provisions)