State v. Farnworth, 430 P.3d 1127

Gary Farnworth II was charged with multiple thefts for falsely reporting he was not working to obtain workers' compensation checks; the State aggregated the alleged thefts into three first-degree theft counts (over $5,000); Farnworth was acquitted of one count.
The two contested counts each covered a series of checks during two separate time periods; individual checks exceeded $750 but were under $5,000 (second-degree theft values).
The State aggregated multiple second-degree-theftable transactions into two first-degree theft counts, asserting each count covered a series of transactions forming a criminal episode or common scheme.
Farnworth moved to dismiss under RCW 9A.56.010(21)(c), arguing aggregation was limited by statute (as interpreted in Hoyt) and that his actions constituted a single scheme, not multiple aggregated counts. The trial court denied the motion.
A jury convicted Farnworth on the two aggregated first-degree counts; the Court of Appeals reversed in part and vacated one conviction. The Washington Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether RCW 9A.56.010(21)(c) limits aggregation for thefts that would be second degree	Farnworth: statute (and Hoyt) requires treating daily losses or a single scheme as one aggregated count; thus prosecutions limited and multiple aggregated first-degree counts improper	State: common-law aggregation permits prosecutorial discretion to aggregate separate, distinct time periods into multiple counts when underlying values support second-degree theft and amounts combine to first-degree	RCW 9A.56.010(21)(c) applies only to aggregating third-degree thefts; common-law rule governs aggregation of second-degree thefts, allowing multiple aggregated counts covering separate and distinct periods
Whether prosecutors may split an ongoing course of theft into multiple aggregated counts without violating double jeopardy	Farnworth: splitting an ongoing scheme arbitrarily punishes the same offense multiple times	State: separate intervening periods and facts justify separate aggregated counts; not arbitrary division	Where factual basis (e.g., distinct nonoverlapping periods and intervening cessation) exists, separate aggregated counts are permissible and do not violate double jeopardy

State v. Linden, 171 Wash. 92 (upholding multiple aggregated larceny counts covering separate, distinct time periods)
State v. Dix, 33 Wash. 405 (allowing single aggregated charge for ongoing embezzlement scheme)
State v. Vining, 2 Wn. App. 802 (aggregation proper when successive takings derive from a single continuing criminal impulse or general scheme)
State v. Hoyt, 79 Wn. App. 494 (interpreting RCW aggregation statute to limit multiple aggregated first-degree counts where underlying thefts are third-degree)
State v. Perkerewicz, 4 Wn. App. 937 (permitting separate aggregated counts for separate monthly schemes where reset of register marked a new episode)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (Double Jeopardy Clause bars dividing a single crime into temporal units to permit multiple prosecutions)