State v. Farnsworth, 185 Wash. 2d 768

Background

On Oct. 15, 2009, Charles Farnsworth and James McFarland planned a bank take: Farnsworth drafted a demand note reading “No die [sic] packs, no tracking devices, put the money in the bag,” and McFarland handed it to a teller while wearing a wig and sunglasses; the teller complied and gave about $300.
Both men were charged with first‑degree robbery (bank robbery). McFarland pled and agreed to testify against Farnsworth; Farnsworth was convicted by a jury of first‑degree robbery and sentenced under Washington’s POAA as a third‑strike offender to life.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding insufficient evidence of a threat and of Farnsworth’s accomplice knowledge, and remanded for theft sentencing; the State sought review and this Court granted review.
The central factual disputed points were (1) whether the demand note amounted to an implied threat of force (distinguishing robbery from theft), and (2) whether Farnsworth knowingly aided or agreed to aid a robbery (accomplice liability).
Farnsworth also raised cumulative trial errors (including exclusion of McFarland’s written plea agreement and other evidentiary rulings) and challenged whether a prior out‑of‑state conviction counts as a strike; the Court affirmed the robbery conviction, rejected cumulative‑error claims, and remanded comparability of the prior conviction to the Court of Appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Farnsworth)	Held
1. Was there sufficient evidence of a threat of force (robbery vs. theft)?	The demand note, its dye‑pack reference, and defendants’ awareness that tellers would treat such notes as threatening objectively implied a threat of force.	Note contained no explicit threat or weapon; insufficient to elevate theft to robbery.	Yes — objective Witherspoon test: an ordinary teller could reasonably infer a threat from the note and context; sufficient evidence of implied threat.
2. Did Farnsworth have requisite knowledge to be an accomplice to robbery?	Farnsworth planned the scheme, wrote the note used, and aided the crime as planned, so he had knowledge the crime would be a robbery.	He only agreed to aid a theft (not a robbery).	Yes — because the note implied a threat and Farnsworth drafted it and helped plan the crime, accomplice liability is supported.
3. Did trial errors (including exclusion of plea agreement) deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial?	Any evidentiary rulings were proper or harmless; jury learned of McFarland’s deal through testimony; exclusion of document was cumulative.	Exclusion of the written plea agreement violated confrontation/cross‑examination rights and was potentially prejudicial; cumulative errors affected fairness.	No reversible error — most claims rejected; exclusion of the plea agreement was within trial court discretion and harmless (lead opinion). Court remands comparability issue.
4. Is Farnsworth’s out‑of‑state prior conviction comparable for POAA purposes?	State did not resolve on review; asked remand for comparability analysis.	Challenges comparability.	Not decided — remanded to Court of Appeals to decide comparability of the prior conviction.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875 (2014) (adopted objective test: would an ordinary person in the victim’s position reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm?)
State v. Collinsworth, 90 Wn. App. 546 (1997) (holding an unequivocal demand for immediate surrender of bank funds, unsupported by lawful entitlement, is fraught with an implicit threat)
State v. Shcherenkov, 146 Wn. App. 619 (2008) (demand notes and defendant conduct can support an implied threat to a teller)
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 (1980) (standard for sufficiency review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (confrontation clause forbids excluding cross‑examination that would expose a witness’s motive for testifying; harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)