State v. F. Torres, 498 P.3d 1256

Torres was charged with three offenses arising from a volatile relationship with Bri: PFMA (Goodwill incident), PFMA (Count II: July 10 headbutt), and Strangulation (Count III: July 13). The jury convicted on Count II, acquitted Count III, and Count I was later dismissed.
Evidence at trial included Bri’s testimony, corroborating roommates and officers, medical photos of Bri’s injuries, an expert on strangulation, and Torres’s own testimony and texts.
Torres testified and denied ever strangling Bri (or anyone); on cross he repeatedly qualified denials with phrases like "not that I can recall." He also blamed an online "smear campaign" that he said was started by Bri and his ex, Meg.
The State did not disclose Meg as a witness pretrial but called her in rebuttal after the defense rested; Meg testified about an uncharged 2014 strangulation of her by Torres and that she pleaded guilty to embezzlement. The court gave a 404(b) limiting instruction the next morning.
Torres appealed, arguing (1) the late, prejudicial admission of Meg’s prior-bad-acts testimony and related Brady/ disclosure violations, and (2) insufficiency of the evidence for the PFMA headbutting conviction.

Issue	State's Argument	Torres's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by permitting Meg to testify	Meg’s testimony was proper rebuttal/impeachment to Torres’s attack on Bri’s credibility and Torres’s assertions about a smear campaign; rebuttal need not be disclosed pretrial	State failed to disclose Meg under §46-15-322; Meg’s testimony was an ambush 404(b) prior-bad-acts admission and violated due process/Brady	Court: Meg’s non-disclosed rebuttal testimony about the smear campaign and embezzlement was permissible; admission of the prior strangulation was error but harmless given the record and other admissible evidence
Whether evidence was sufficient to sustain PFMA (Count II) conviction	Ample evidence (Bri’s testimony, corroboration, photos, Torres’s texts including an admission) supported conviction beyond a reasonable doubt	Meg’s testimony and its prejudicial effect rendered the conviction unreliable; contact was accidental and defendant lacked requisite intent	Court: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support the PFMA conviction

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose materially exculpatory or impeachment evidence to protect due process)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for undisclosed impeachment evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (cumulative effect of suppressed evidence may undermine confidence in verdict)
State v. Weitzel, 299 Mont. 192, 998 P.2d 1154 (2000) (prosecution not required to disclose impeachment-only rebuttal witnesses pretrial)
State v. Polak, 392 Mont. 90, 422 P.3d 112 (2018) (defendant’s testimony can "open the door" to otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence)
State v. Gowan, 302 Mont. 127, 13 P.3d 376 (2000) (risk and prejudice from prior-bad-acts evidence and limits of Rule 404(b))
State v. Colburn, 391 Mont. 449, 419 P.3d 1196 (2018) (harmless-error analysis where prejudicial 404(b) evidence was admitted)