State v. Evans
237 Ariz. 231
| Ariz. | 2015Background
- Deputies observed Dale Evans making three rapid, closed-fisted arm movements toward a passenger while stopped at an intersection; deputy testified he did not see contact but suspected an assault and directed a traffic stop.
- The stop led to Evans’s arrest for marijuana possession, drug paraphernalia, and aggravated DUI; Evans moved to suppress evidence as the stop lacked reasonable suspicion.
- Trial court denied suppression, finding the arm movements were articulable facts justifying investigation; the court of appeals affirmed, rejecting a requirement that officers show how observed factors “eliminate” innocent conduct.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide whether reasonable suspicion requires showing the observed circumstances eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.
- The Court considered the totality-of-the-circumstances reasonable-suspicion standard and whether an additional “serve to eliminate” requirement is constitutionally required.
Issues
| Issue | Evans' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether reasonable suspicion requires showing the facts eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers | Arresting officers must show the observed factors together "serve to eliminate" a substantial portion of innocent motorists | No extra elimination showing required; particularized, objective suspicion under the totality of circumstances suffices | Held: No additional constitutional requirement; officer need not quantify or expressly rule out innocent explanations |
| Whether officers must expressly rule out innocent explanations at suppression hearings | Evans: officers must affirmatively consider and testify how innocent explanations were excluded | State: officers need not rule out innocent explanations; courts assess objective reasonableness | Held: Officers need not expressly rule out innocent explanations; courts evaluate totality and reasonable inferences |
| Whether particularized suspicion necessarily limits stops to a small class of people | Evans: ambiguity suggests risk of sweeping in many innocents unless elimination shown | State: particularized suspicion by definition does not cover large categories; suffices to limit scope | Held: Particularized, objective suspicion inherently narrows who may be stopped; no separate numeric showing required |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying suppression here | Evans: stop lacked reasonable suspicion because movements could be innocent | State: deputy reasonably inferred possible assault/domestic violence from rapid closed-fist movements | Held: No abuse of discretion; observation justified investigatory stop to investigate possible assault |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (totality-of-circumstances requirement for particularized suspicion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (investigatory stop standard)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (reasonable suspicion requires minimal objective justification)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (totality-of-the-circumstances, commonsense inferences)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (review standard and commonsense approach to Fourth Amendment questions)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (officer need not rule out innocent explanations)
- Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (particularized suspicion limits scope of stops)
- Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (officer need not eliminate innocent explanations for reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. formulation of "serve to eliminate" language discussed and rejected as a constitutional requirement)
- United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. decision cited by Evans as adopting an "eliminate" test)
