State v. Evans, 298 P.3d 724

Evans stole a business check from Allube Inc., forged the signature, and cashed $500.
Evans was charged with second degree identity theft under RCW 9.35.020(3) and convicted after a bench trial.
Evans argued the statute criminalizes theft of natural persons’ identities only or, alternatively, that the statute is vague.
The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review.
The majority held the statute covers corporate victims and provides fair warning and workable standards; the dissent would exclude corporations and would apply lenity.
The record includes legislative history showing protection of small businesses and corporations; the debate referenced various amendments and the phrase “living or dead.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does RCW 9.35.020 include corporate victims?	Evans argues corporations are not within the statute.	State contends the plain language and history include corporations as victims.	Yes; corporations are victims under the statute.
Is the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to corporate identity theft?	Evans claims ambiguity makes the statute void for vagueness.	State asserts provisions provide fair warning and objective standards.	Not unconstitutionally vague; fair warning and workable standards exist.
Does legislative history clearly show inclusion of corporations as victims?	Evans contends history does not clearly include corporations.	State argues history shows intent to protect businesses and individuals.	Legislative history supports inclusion of corporations; lenity not triggered.
What is the proper interpretation when language is ambiguous between two reasonable readings?	Evans argues for lenity in favor of the defendant when ambiguity exists.	State argues interpretation should follow legislative history, not lenity.	Lenity not triggered; statute interpreted to include corporations.
Does the statute’s application rely on subjective terms or enable arbitrary enforcement?	Evans contends ambiguity could enable arbitrary enforcement.	State asserts objective standards and limited ambiguity before construction.	Not arbitrary; standards are objective and construction resolves ambiguities.

State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909 (Wash. 2012) (establishes interpretive framework for legislative intent)
State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815 (Wash. 2010) (guides construction of ambiguous statutes)
City of Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d 451 (Wash. 2009) (ambiguity resolved via legislative history and lenity considerations)
State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596 (Wash. 2005) (principles on ambiguity and lenity in criminal statutes)
In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795 (Wash. 1993) (reiterates interpretive approach in statutory context)
Wilson v. State, 125 Wn.2d 212 (Wash. 1994) (statutory interpretation balancing plain language and legislative history)