State v. Ester Aboytes Anderson
445 S.W.3d 895
Tex. App.2014Background
- Court of Appeals, Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont; State appeals suppression of blood-draw evidence in a DWI with a child case.
- Anderson was arrested for driving while intoxicated with a two-year-old passenger following a one-car crash; a blood sample was taken at the hospital without a warrant after she refused consent.
- Trial court granted a motion to suppress the blood-draw evidence; the State appealed under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5), (e).
- Record includes live testimony from DPS Trooper Chapman, DPS Sgt. Barnhill, and ADA; Martinez provided an affidavit; a court order for a black-box data download preceded the blood draw.
- State argued the blood draw was authorized by Texas Transportation Code sections 724.011 and 724.012 and that exigent circumstances existed; Anderson argued there were no exigent circumstances and the implied-consent/mandatory-draw provisions do not create per se exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.
- The appellate court affirmed the suppression ruling, concluding there were no exigent circumstances and the implied-consent/mandatory-blood-draw provisions do not create a per se exception to the Fourth Amendment; good-faith reliance on the statute does not apply here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the blood draw without a warrant was justified under 724.012(b) or exigent circumstances. | State: statute authorizes taking a specimen upon reasonable grounds and potential exigency. | Anderson: no warrant, no exigency under totality-of-circumstances; McNeely controls. | No; no exigent circumstances and no per se exception under 724.012(b); suppression affirmed. |
| Whether implied consent (724.011) permits warrantless blood draws when the defendant refuses. | State: implied consent expands police power to draw blood. | Anderson: McNeely invalidates treating implied consent as a blanket exception. | Not a per se exception; McNeely governs; cannot override Fourth Amendment without exigency. |
| Whether 724.012(b) or implied-consent provisions may be construed to create exigent circumstances. | State: statutory framework could create exigency. | Anderson: no statutory basis for exigency; case-by-case totality-of-circumstances controls. | No exigeny found; totality of circumstances does not justify warrantless blood draw. |
| Whether the State may rely on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. | State: reliance on statutory framework supports good faith. | Anderson: Texas good-faith exception is narrow and does not apply when no warrant issued. | No good-faith exception; exclusionary-rule analysis for Texas does not apply here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (warrantless blood draw may be valid only under exigent circumstances or consent)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (does not create per se exigency; totality-of-the-circumstances analysis applies)
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (U.S. 2014) (warrant required for digital data searches; informs totality analysis)
- Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (U.S. 2013) (DNA cheek swab as minimal intrusion in routine booking; relevance to reasonableness of searches)
- McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (searches and exigent circumstances principles in Texas context)