State v. Erickson
2011 ND 49
| N.D. | 2011Background
- G.L.D. was incarcerated since 1996 after a gross sexual imposition conviction and committed in 2007 for treatment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
- In Oct. 2008, the state petitioned for discharge; the court appointed Dr. Plaud for independent evaluation and Dr. Lisota for hospital evaluation.
- Dr. Sullivan (State Hospital) concluded G.L.D. remained sexually dangerous in Oct. 2008.
- Plaud issued an Jan. 5, 2010 evaluation concluding G.L.D. was not a sexually dangerous individual.
- The court denied a third continuance, accepted Plaud’s evaluation earlier, then allowed a new discharge petition in Feb. 2010 after Lisota evaluated him.
- The district court ultimately denied the discharge petition, finding by clear and convincing evidence that G.L.D. remains sexually dangerous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved G.L.D. remains sexually dangerous by clear and convincing evidence | G.L.D. argues the evidence does not show a current dangerous disorder | State claims Lisota’s evaluation supports continued danger | Yes; court’s finding supported by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether the court properly credited Lisota over Plaud on the expert evidence | Plaud’s opinion should prevail over Lisota’s | Court correctly weighed conflicting expert testimony | Yes; credibility determinations are for the trial court and not clearly erroneous |
| Whether the review standard applied was correct for discharge petitions | Standard misapplied | District court applied modified clearly erroneous standard | Yes; standard properly applied to uphold denial of discharge |
Key Cases Cited
- Matter of Midgett, 2010 ND 98 (2010 ND) (burden of proof in discharge hearings is clear and convincing evidence)
- G.R.H., 2006 ND 56 (2006 ND) (requires a connection between disorder and dangerousness under Crane for due process)
- Rush, 2009 ND 102 (2009 ND) (credibility determinations of experts are district court’s responsibility)
- Hehn, 2008 ND 36 (2008 ND) (reaffirming deference to the trial court’s assessment of actuarial evidence)
- A.M., 2010 ND 163 (2010 ND) (standard for evaluating evidence in discharge petitions involves reasonable weight to expert testimony)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (due process requires showing serious difficulty controlling behavior to be sexually dangerous)