State v. Erick L., 168 Conn. App. 386

Victim born 1997; defendant (Erick L.) born 1984. Defendant lived with victim's mother; alleged inappropriate touching began in 2007 and escalated through 2010, when victim was 11–12.
Victim disclosed to boyfriend (late 2009) and later to grandmother (Jan 2010); family contacted police and defendant was arrested and charged with multiple sex offenses and risk of injury to a child.
At trial the jury convicted defendant of two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child; other counts were acquitted.
Pretrial, the state moved to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct under the rape-shield statute, § 54-86f; defense sought to admit letters showing victim’s sexual relationship with boyfriend to prove motive and alternative source of sexual knowledge.
Trial court excluded evidence revealing sexual nature of victim’s relationship (allowed only non‑sexual aspects of the dispute); defendant appealed, raising (1) Sixth Amendment confrontation/present-defense claims tied to § 54-86f exclusion and (2) claim that seating juror D.W. violated right to an impartial jury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Whether exclusion under § 54-86f of evidence that victim had sex with boyfriend violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights (confrontation/present defense)	State: Exclusion proper under rape‑shield; sexual nature not required to show motive and alternative sexual knowledge unnecessary	Defendant: Letters showing sexual relationship were material to rebut presumption victim lacked sexual knowledge and showed motive to fabricate after grounding/ breakup	Court: Evidence was material and relevant to motive but not so critical to defense that exclusion violated Sixth Amendment; court did not abuse discretion in excluding sexual‑conduct details
2. Whether seating juror D.W., who stated children are generally more truthful, violated right to impartial jury	State: D.W. said he would follow court instructions and evaluate witnesses individually; therefore impartial	Defendant: D.W.’s stated tendency to believe children and prior experience believing a child abuse claim showed fixed bias	Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion; D.W. repeatedly acknowledged he would put aside prior experience, treat witnesses equally, and judge credibility based on evidence

Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (exclusion of evidence that completely foreclosed defense theory violated Sixth Amendment)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (restriction on cross-examination that removes evidentiary support for bias impeaches confrontation right)
State v. Wright, 320 Conn. 781 (2016) (interpreting rape‑shield § 54-86f and test for materiality, relevance, constitutional necessity)
State v. Cortes, 276 Conn. 241 (2005) (sexual nature of victim’s relationship relevant to motive to fabricate)
State v. Rolon, 257 Conn. 156 (2001) (alternative source of sexual knowledge may be critical where child displays unusual sexual knowledge)
State v. Crespo, 303 Conn. 589 (2012) (exclusion of sexual‑conduct evidence did not necessarily violate Sixth Amendment where other inquiry allowed)
State v. Mark R., 300 Conn. 590 (2011) (challenge to limitation on motive inquiry assessed by whether some inquiry into motive was permitted)