State v. Elmore
241 Or. App. 419
Or. Ct. App.2011Background
- June 4, 2007 Deputy Cochran observed Elmore driving and noticed a large windshield crack, prompting a stop for obstruction under ORS 815.220.
- Elmore argued the windshield crack is not a 'material' within ORS 815.220(2) and thus cannot support probable cause to stop, though Cochran learned Elmore had a suspended license during the stop.
- Trial court denied suppression, ruling Cochran had probable cause to stop for ORS 815.220 based on the crack, and Elmore pled guilty with a right to appeal the ruling.
- On appeal, the court addressed whether a crack qualifies as a 'material' that prohibits or impairs visibility, under ORS 815.220(2).
- The court concluded that 'material' connotes physical substances listed in the statute (e.g., signs, adhesive film, glaze), and a crack is not a separate material from the window itself.
- Because the deputy lacked probable cause to stop under ORS 815.220, the stop violated Article I, section 9, and the evidence obtained was the tainted product of that illegality; the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a windshield crack is a 'material' under ORS 815.220(2). | Cochran's view that anything impairing visibility qualifies under 815.220(2). | A crack is not a tangible 'material' within the plain meaning of the statute. | A crack is not a 'material'; stop invalid for lack of probable cause. |
| Whether the deputy had probable cause to stop under ORS 815.220(2) given the crack. | Crack satisfied 'material' impairment of visibility, establishing probable cause. | Crack does not meet the statute's material requirement; no probable cause. | No probable cause under 815.220(2); stop unconstitutional. |
| Whether the stop could be sustained on alternative grounds of probable cause for another traffic infraction. | Officer may rely on other statutes if the stop was for a traffic infraction. | State did not preserve alternative grounds below; record insufficient. | Not addressed; the court declined to affirm on alternative grounds due to preservation issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tiffin, 202 Or.App. 199 (2005) (probable cause to stop for traffic infraction requires objective reasonableness of perceived facts)
- State v. Boatright, 222 Or.App. 406 (2008) (probable cause may be based on a mistake of fact so long as perceived facts establish elements of an offense)
- State v. Jackson, 149 Or.App. 662 (1997) (ability to stop depends on probable cause to believe a traffic infraction occurred)
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606 (1993) (statutory interpretation—text and context and legislative history considered)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (2009) (interpretation of statutory terms using plain meaning and context)
- State v. Bassett, 234 Or.App. 259 (2010) (context of statutory terms and application to traffic stop analysis)