State v. Ellington
1701005777
| Del. Super. Ct. | Aug 3, 2017Background
- Defendant Jakevis Ellington (born June 27, 2002) was 14 when indicted on April 17, 2017 for: Murder 1st, Robbery 1st, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), and Conspiracy 2nd based on a January 9, 2017 store robbery that resulted in the clerk's death.
- Co-defendant Devonte Dorsett admitted possessing the firearm, identified Ellington, and gave a statement that Ellington suggested the robbery and helped take money from the register; Dorsett said he accidentally fired the fatal shot.
- Ellington gave a different account claiming he was coerced at gunpoint by Dorsett, fled the scene after hearing a shot, and had limited involvement.
- At the reverse-amenability hearing the State presented testimony and reports; defense submitted psychological and amenability evaluations showing minimal juvenile record, significant trauma history, treatment needs, and that Ellington is amenable to Family Court rehabilitation.
- The court conducted the statutory reverse-amenability analysis (10 Del. C. § 1011(b)), including a prima facie likelihood-of-conviction threshold, and considered the four statutory factors (nature of offense and prior record; past treatment and response; interests of society and defendant; other relevant factors).
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Ellington's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prima facie likelihood of conviction at trial | Evidence (Dorsett's statement, identification, ballistics linking Dorsett's gun) supports a fair likelihood of conviction | Duress/coercion defense undermines likelihood of conviction | Court: State met its burden — fair likelihood of conviction exists despite duress defense because a jury could credit Dorsett and convict |
| Relevance of duress as a bar to prima facie showing | Duress does not negate the State's obligation to show prima facie evidence; it is a potential affirmative defense for trial | Duress should lower likelihood of conviction and counsel against transfer | Court: Duress is of limited import at threshold; even assuming duress, fair likelihood of conviction remains |
| Weight of "nature of present offense" (severity and role) | Seriousness of homicide and firearm charges favors retention in Superior Court | Ellington was younger, less culpable, possibly coerced; youth is mitigating | Court: This subfactor weighs against transfer — offense severity and active participation (even if limited) are significant |
| Amenability / best forum for rehabilitation (other § 1011(b) factors) | Society's interest favors adult incarceration given child-welfare history and risk of recidivism | Ellington has minimal juvenile record, substantial treatment needs, and experts recommend Family Court/YRS; transfer better serves rehabilitation | Court: Overall statutory factors (prior record, treatment prospects, society's interest) favor transfer; transfer to Family Court granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del. 1994) (discusses reverse amenability and statutory framework)
- Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181 (Del. 1993) (establishes evidentiary review for charging decision in amenability context)
- Mayhall v. State, 659 A.2d 790 (Del. 1995) (standard for real probability of conviction at reverse amenability hearing)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile culpability and mitigating qualities of youth)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (recognition of youth as mitigating in sentencing and culpability analyses)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile sentencing jurisprudence acknowledging developmental differences)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (procedural implications of juvenile-sentencing precedents)