State v. Elizabeth MacFarland
2021 VT 87
Vt.2021Background
- On Dec. 21, 2018, Elizabeth MacFarland drank heavily at a Brattleboro bar, became disruptive, and refused the bouncer’s repeated requests to leave. Police were called and carried out a struggling, handcuffed MacFarland; she ripped plastic from a cruiser and loudly protested.
- MacFarland was charged with several misdemeanors, including unlawful trespass (13 V.S.A. § 3705(a)(1)(A)) and resisting arrest (13 V.S.A. § 3017(a)(1)).
- At arraignment the court issued a generic week-of scheduling/discovery order requiring notice of alibi, insanity, or diminished capacity per V.R.Cr.P. 12.1(b) within 30 days.
- At the one-day bench trial defense counsel sought to develop intoxication evidence and indicated an intent to argue diminished capacity; the State had not received prior notice.
- The trial court ultimately sanctioned the defense by precluding any diminished-capacity theory and convicted MacFarland of unlawful trespass and resisting arrest.
- MacFarland appealed, arguing Rule 12.1 does not require advance notice when no experts will be used, the scheduling order could not independently impose that requirement as written, and the trespass statute’s “actual communication” notice element is subjective and could be negated by intoxication/diminished capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does V.R.Cr.P. 12.1 require advance notice of a diminished-capacity defense when no expert testimony will be offered? | Rule 12.1 requires notice of diminished capacity. | Rule 12.1’s plain text requires notice only for alibi, insanity, or when offering expert testimony on mental condition; it does not compel notice for lay-supported diminished-capacity defenses. | Rule 12.1 does not require advance notice of diminished capacity if the defendant will not call expert witnesses. |
| Could the trial court’s scheduling/discovery order validly impose a 12.1-style notice requirement and justify preclusion as sanction? | The superior court has Rule 12(e) authority to issue discovery/scheduling orders; the scheduling order therefore required notice. | The scheduling order’s reference to Rule 12.1(b) did not actually require notice for a non‑expert diminished‑capacity defense because Rule 12.1(b) only prescribes written‑notice form when an alibi, insanity, or expert testimony is involved. | The scheduling order, as written, did not validly require notice of a diminished-capacity defense absent expert testimony; the court therefore erred in precluding the defense on that basis (court did not decide proportionality of sanction). |
| Was precluding the diminished-capacity defense harmless error given the record? | Any intoxication evidence the defense introduced was considered by the court; preclusion did not affect substantial rights. | Intoxication evidence could negate specific intent elements of both resisting arrest and unlawful trespass; preclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | Error was not harmless. Intoxication evidence could have negated the specific-intent elements; the State still bore the burden to prove mental elements beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Does the “actual communication” notice element of the misdemeanor trespass statute denote an objective or subjective standard (i.e., must defendant perceive notice)? | The statute does not require subjective knowledge; recent precedent limited knowledge implications. | “Actual communication” means the communication must have been brought to the defendant’s perception; the element is subjective and can be negated by intoxication. | “Actual communication” denotes a subjective standard; defendant’s perception matters and diminished capacity/intoxication may negate the notice (and thus mental) element. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Amidon, 967 A.2d 1126 (rule interpretation and de novo review of procedural rules)
- State v. Villar, 180 A.3d 588 (use plain language of rule for construction)
- State v. Gurung, 251 A.3d 572 (procedural rules have statutory force)
- State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (intoxication may negate required mental state)
- State v. Webster, 179 A.3d 149 (distinguishing insanity burden from diminished-capacity mental-element challenge)
- State v. Congress, 114 A.3d 1128 (voluntary intoxication can form basis for diminished-capacity defense)
- State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174 (distinguishing objective standards for notice by signage)
- State v. Richards, 256 A.3d 94 (interpreting elements of § 3705(a) and interplay with knowledge)
- State v. Bourn, 58 A.3d 236 (Legislature can imply specific intent; precluding diminished capacity can be error)
- State v. Duford, 660 A.2d 736 (insufficient evidence may justify refusing a diminished-capacity instruction)
Outcome: Judgment reversed and case remanded for further findings and conclusions consistent with holding that Rule 12.1 does not require advance notice for non‑expert diminished‑capacity defenses, the scheduling order did not validly impose such notice as written, and the preclusion was not harmless; court to reconsider the impact of intoxication on the specific-intent elements (trespass and resisting arrest).