204 A.3d 883
N.H.2019Background
- Defendant Edward Proctor, a registered sex offender convicted of sexual assault and on parole, was required to acknowledge he could not undertake employment or volunteer service involving the care, instruction, or guidance of minors under RSA 632-A:10, I.
- Proctor operated a landscaping business and hired a nearby juvenile to perform landscaping tasks (snow-blowing, yard work, pulling weeds, laying mulch); he picked the youth up and directed the work.
- The juvenile’s mother later learned of Proctor’s status and told her son to stop working for him; Proctor was indicted under RSA 632-A:10, I for knowingly undertaking employment involving care, instruction, or guidance of minors.
- At pretrial and trial, Proctor challenged the statute’s meaning; the trial court interpreted “undertook employment” to include both applying for/accepting positions involving supervision and hiring minors, but required that the employment involve responsibility for supervision or management of the minor.
- The jury was instructed accordingly and convicted Proctor; on appeal he argued (preserved via pretrial motion and instruction objections) that RSA 632-A:10, I does not criminalize his landscaping employment because landscaping does not inherently involve the care, instruction, or guidance of children.
- The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and reversed, holding that the statute targets services that by their nature provide access to children and does not encompass landscaping work that does not inherently provide such access.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Proctor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "undertook employment" criminalizes hiring a minor or only accepting employment | Statute covers any employment or volunteer service that involves care, instruction, or guidance of minors; nature of service immaterial | "To undertake employment" means accepting employment; hiring a minor is not covered (and landscaping is not a listed example) | Court declined to decide narrow hiring-definition issue, resolving case on statutory scope instead |
| Whether landscaping work is proscribed because it "involv[es] the care, instruction or guidance" of minors | Activities involving a minor—even unrelated services—can fall within statute if they involve care, instruction, or guidance (State equated that phrase with supervision) | Landscaping does not inherently involve care, instruction, or guidance; the statutory examples show focus on roles that by nature provide access to children | Court held landscaping is not a service that by its nature provides access to children and thus is not proscribed by RSA 632-A:10, I |
| Proper application of ejusdem generis to the statute's list of examples | The list does not limit the statute to organizational volunteers or to roles similar to listed examples | The general phrase should be limited to things similar to the listed roles (teacher, coach, daycare, camp counselor, etc.) | Court applied ejusdem generis: general words read to cover objects similar in nature to listed occupations; organizational affiliation not material but access-to-children characteristic is critical |
| Whether the trial court’s additional requirement (supervision/management language in jury instruction) was proper | Trial court’s added supervision/management element aligned with statutory purpose | The court improperly added an element not in the statute | Court did not rest decision solely on that instruction; reversed based on statutory scope (landscaping not within statute) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McInnis, 169 N.H. 565 (discussing preservation requirements for appellate review)
- State v. Santamaria, 169 N.H. 722 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Wilson, 169 N.H. 755 (interpreting RSA 632-A:10 and applying ejusdem generis; legislative focus on services that by nature provide access to children)
- In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48 (explaining ejusdem generis principle)
- Kurowski v. Town of Chester, 170 N.H. 307 (ejusdem generis application)
- State v. Dor, 165 N.H. 198 (rejecting overbroad statutory readings even if they further legislative goal)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (principle that advancing an objective alone does not justify reading beyond statutory text)