State v. Easter
241 Or. App. 574
| Or. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Defendant Easter was charged with second-degree theft and interfering with a police officer after stealing a vacuum from Home Depot; he had a long prior criminal history and sought private counsel despite court-appointed counsel Tibbetts.
- Trial occurred January 30, 2008; Easter actively participated, including waiving attendance during a separate hearing and arguing about jury handling; he ultimately accepted Tibbetts as a legal advisor for closing arguments.
- Easter waived the right to counsel for his closing arguments; the court warned of risks of self-representation and allowed Tibbetts to stay as advisor; Easter proceeded to give a self-represented closing argument under ground rules.
- Jury found Easter guilty on both counts; the court scheduled sentencing and noted Easter had fired Tibbetts by the time of sentencing.
- A series of sentencing continuances were granted at Easter’s request to allow for mental health evaluations and funds to hire private counsel; Tibbetts appeared at intervals with minor involvement.
- On May 23, 2008, Easter appeared without Tibbetts, requested counsel at sentencing (denied), and moved for another continuance to address mental health; the court proceeded to sentence Easter to six months on theft and five days concurrent on the other count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the waiver of counsel at closing arguments knowingly made? | State argues waiver valid under totality of circumstances. | Easter contends the warning did not explain risks, so waiver not knowingly made. | Waiver knowingly made under totality of circumstances. |
| Did the trial court err in accepting the waiver without adequate risk explanation under the Sixth Amendment and Article I, §11? | State asserts same totality-of-circumstances analysis applies; knowingly proper. | Easter contends lacking proper colloquy and explanation for risks. | The waiver was knowing and intelligent under both constitutions. |
| Was the denial of counsel at the sentencing hearing an abuse of discretion? | State contends the court acted within discretion given delays and defendant’s prior actions. | Easter argues he needed counsel at sentencing due to complexity and health issues. | No abuse; court properly denied counsel at sentencing. |
| Did the court violate right to counsel by proceeding to sentencing without defense representation? | State maintains continuances allowed and representative role feasible through prior arrangements. | Easter asserts lack of representation at sentencing violated his rights. | Proceeding to sentencing without counsel did not violate rights given circumstances. |
| Was the sentencing procedure invalid due to defendant's lack of counsel and continuances? | State argues procedure adhered to discretion and public interest in expediency. | Easter contends multiple delays and lack of counsel tainted sentencing. | Sentencing upheld; no reversible error in procedure or continuance denial. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wyatt, 331 Or. 335 (2000) (preservation exception for unawareness of risks of self-representation)
- State v. Cole, 323 Or. 30 (1996) (waiver of counsel reviewed for knowingness under lack of objection)
- State v. Meyrick, 313 Or. 125 (1992) (knowingly component requires awareness of right and risks; totality of circumstances)
- State v. Jackson, 172 Or. App. 414 (2001) (totality of circumstances approach to waiver)
- State v. Reynolds, 224 Or. App. 411 (2008) (prior experience with criminal justice supports knowing waiver)
- State v. Hug, 186 Or. App. 569 (2003) (continuance to obtain counsel balancing rights and expedition)
- State v. Martinez, 224 Or. App. 588 (2008) (continuance denial not abuse where no good cause shown)
- State v. Sparklin, 296 Or. 85 (1983) (critical stage when counsel absence may impair defense)
