State v. E. Yeaton, 2021 MT 312

Defendant Eric D. Yeaton pleaded guilty to felony operation of a vehicle with BAC ≥ .08 after a Jan. 20, 2019 stop; he had at least four prior DUI convictions.
District Court sentenced Yeaton to five years (two suspended), imposed a $5,000 statutory fine, and assessed $560 in additional fees/surcharges (total fines/fees $5,560).
The judgment also ordered payment of imprisonment, probation, and alcohol-treatment costs “if financially able.”
Yeaton’s sole income was Social Security disability (≈ $550/month); he objected at sentencing that he could not afford the fines/fees and cited State v. Eaton (42 U.S.C. § 407 issue).
On appeal the Montana Supreme Court addressed (1) whether imposing fines/fees against an SSDI recipient is lawful, (2) whether the court failed to inquire into ability to pay, and (3) whether conditioning treatment/probation/imprisonment costs on later ability-to-pay (deferring to DOC) was permissible.
Court disposition: affirmed in part and reversed in part — the $5,000 fine and the conditional “if financially able” cost order were upheld; the $560 in fees/surcharges was reversed and remanded for a required ability-to-pay inquiry.

Issue	State's Argument	Yeaton's Argument	Held
1. Legality of imposing fines/fees when defendant’s only income is Social Security	Court may impose fines/fees even if Social Security cannot later be garnished; debt creation is distinct from requiring SS as payment	Imposition effectively targets protected Social Security benefits in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 407	Affirmed: Imposition is lawful (per State v. Ingram); Social Security funds may not be garnished to satisfy the debt but fines/fees can be assessed
2. Whether court failed to inquire into ability to pay fines/fees	$5,000 fine is statutory/mandatory so §§ requiring ability-to-pay inquiry do not apply; other fees are subject to inquiry	Objected at sentencing that he cannot afford fines/fees and invoked inability-to-pay protections	Partial affirm/reverse: $5,000 fine upheld as within statutory parameters; $560 in fees/surcharges reversed and remanded for the required ability-to-pay inquiry
3. Whether ordering imprisonment/probation/treatment costs “if financially able” (with DOC to determine later) was error	Conditional language complies with § 61-8-731 and courts may defer assessment of those costs to DOC because actual costs and ability often are known later	Trial court should make specific findings about defendant’s ability to pay (not wholly defer to DOC)	Affirmed: Conditional order is permissible; deferral to DOC for assessment is allowed under precedent (Ingram/Daricek distinction)

State v. Ingram, 478 P.3d 799 (Mont. 2020) (distinguishes creation of a debt from compelling Social Security be used to pay it; permits imposition of fines that may not be collected from SS)
State v. Eaton, 99 P.3d 661 (Mont. 2004) (holding that statutes or orders that effectively require Social Security benefits to be used to satisfy fines violate 42 U.S.C. § 407)
State v. Mingus, 84 P.3d 658 (Mont. 2004) (district court must make specific findings regarding ability to pay certain costs; statutory mandatory fines not subject to ability-to-pay inquiry under that decision)
State v. Daricek, 412 P.3d 1044 (Mont. 2018) (upheld conditional cost orders where district court made findings suggesting likely ability to pay; recognized DOC’s role in assessing post-incarceration costs)
State v. McLeod, 61 P.3d 126 (Mont. 2002) (discusses the necessity of a serious inquiry or separate determination for ability-to-pay findings)
State v. Kotwicki, 151 P.3d 892 (Mont. 2007) (failure to timely object to sentence terms can waive appellate review of discretionary sentencing issues)