State v. Dustin Thomas Armstrong
158 Idaho 364
Idaho Ct. App.2015Background
- Armstrong was on parole and had signed a parole condition waiving Fourth Amendment protections and consenting to searches of his person, residence, and vehicle by “any agent of Field and Community Services.”
- Armstrong’s mother called police reporting concerning behavior; officers located Armstrong in a credit union parking lot.
- A parole hotline informed officers Armstrong was on parole; the on-call parole officer, relying on Armstrong’s waiver, requested police search Armstrong’s vehicle.
- A drug dog alerted to a safe in the vehicle; the safe—owned by Armstrong’s mother—contained her checkbook, leading to grand theft charges against Armstrong.
- Armstrong moved to suppress evidence from the warrantless vehicle search; the district court initially granted the motion, then reconsidered and denied suppression, concluding local police acted as agents of Probation and Parole.
- Armstrong pled guilty reserving the right to appeal the denial of suppression; the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Armstrong) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Armstrong preserved a state-constitutional nondelegation claim | The claim was not presented below, so not preserved for appeal | The delegation argument challenges constitutional limits on parole delegation | Not preserved; Court declines to consider as raised for first time on appeal |
| Whether Article X, §5 (Board duty) prohibits delegation to local police | Even if raised, no unconstitutional delegation occurred because no decision-making power was transferred | Parole’s constitutional duty to supervise (including searches) cannot be delegated to police | Court: No unconstitutional delegation—police assistance was limited and not a transfer of Board decision-making authority |
| Whether the warrantless search exceeded the scope of Armstrong’s Fourth Amendment waiver | The waiver allowed searches by “any agent of Probation and Parole”; officers acted under parole officer direction | The waiver only covered searches by actual Probation and Parole employees; police acting alone exceeded scope | Court: Search was within waiver scope—police acted as temporary, limited agents of Probation and Parole |
| Whether parole officer’s physical absence invalidates agency/consent | Parole officer’s direction suffices; physical presence not required | Physical absence meant police were not acting as agents of Probation and Parole | Court: Absence is immaterial; agency relationship and reasonableness preserved |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559 (discussing standard of review for suppression rulings)
- State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102 (trial court’s factfinding at suppression hearings)
- State v. Peters, 130 Idaho 960 (parole/probation officers may enlist police aid to perform justified searches)
- State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206 (Fourth Amendment waivers as probation/parole consent to search)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (objective-reasonableness standard for scope of consent searches)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (government’s substantial interest in supervising parolees)